Study Material: Introduction to Microeconomics II OEC 107 by Kazungu, Khatib
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This course unit (OEC 107) is an extension of the Introduction to Microeconomics part I (OEC 101). As such, it is strongly advised that students must first read and understand all lectures covered in the (OEC 101) before reading this course unit. The reason behind is that throughout this course unit, we will be using some concepts and theories that have been presented in the former course unit more often than not.

Just like in the Introduction to Microeconomics part I (OEC 101), we wish to emphasize that all lectures contained in this reading material have been designed specifically for first year students in economics, business studies or other fields of studies in undergraduate programs, which include an introductory course in microeconomics. 

The general objective of this course unit is to impart students with adequate knowledge and skills, which will help them to understand theoretical foundation on the topics of markets, general equilibrium, welfare economics, public goods and externalities. The unit also prepares students for an intermediate microeconomic course, which demand rigorous quantitative techniques in solving and analyzing microeconomic problems. 

UNIT OBJECTIVES
	After reading this course unit, you should be able to:(i)	Describe and explain the determination of price and output under 	different market structures (i.e. perfect competition, monopoly, 	monopolistic competition and oligopoly) (ii)	Show how inputs (i.e. factors of production) are priced under 	different market structures(iii)	Describe and explain the theory of general equilibrium(iv)	Discuss welfare economics and show how the theory of welfare 	economics is linked to the general equilibrium analysis(v)	Explain the concept of “public goods” and describe the optimal 	provision of public goods; explain and illustrate with practical 	examples on how the cost benefit analysis and voting rules can be 	used as alternatives to price 	mechanism in the provision of 	public goods. (vi)	Explain and illustrate sources and causes of externalities; various 	forms of externalities and their implications on the markets; outline 	the solutions that can be used to internalize externalities. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE COURSE UNIT
This course unit is organized in eleven lectures. Each lecture starts with an introductory part followed by the objectives. We then present the main substance covering major sub-topics that you are supposed to learn from that particular lecture. At the end of each lecture, you will find a series of questions that you should look for solutions in order to reinforce your comprehension in grasping theoretical concepts. In an effort to guide the student on how to answer exercises, the solutions for a few selected questions with asterisks in each lecture are provided at the end of this reading material. 
Lecture one begins by setting out the assumptions of the perfectly competitive market. It then shows how the firm’s supply curve is derived. The conditions for profit maximization are also spelled out. We then describe the equilibrium of the firm and industry both in the short run and long run. The lecture ends with a description on how we derive the long run supply curves under the increasing, decreasing and constant cost industries.   

The theory of monopoly market structure is treated in the second lecture. The lecture starts by sketching out the basis of monopoly power. The reasons for the shape of demand curve, marginal revenue and their relationship are also explained. The lecture then proceeds quickly to demonstrate equilibrium of the firm both in the short run and in the long run. The lecture also identifies the conditions under which price discrimination is practiced. The regulation of monopoly firm by the government is presented in the last section. 

Lecture three discusses monopolistic competition. It starts by outlining the assumptions of the monopolistic competition. It then explains the importance of product differentiation and embarks straight away to illustrate the short run and long run equilibrium of the firm. The comparison between monopolistic competition and perfect competition are also presented. Finally, the lecture provides a critique on the theory of monopolistic competition.

In lecture four, a theory of oligopoly is presented. The lecture begins by pointing out the basis of oligopoly and its classification. Thereafter, the lecture explains and describes the models of non-collusive oligopoly such as Cournot, Betrand and Kinked demand curve models. This is followed with a description of collusive models of oligopolies, which includes: cartel, market sharing cartel and price leadership. 

Lecture five introduces the rudiments of game theory. Game theory is increasingly used as an analytical device for studying strategic movements by various firms involved in the markets. The lecture commences by defining important concepts in game theory such as zero sum games, cooperative and uncooperative games, strategies, players and payoffs. We then study dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium. The weakness of Nash equilibrium is also outlined. Finally, the lecture presents prisoners’ dilemma and its application in economics. 

Lecture six considers the market for the inputs (i.e. factors of production in perfectly competitive environment). It begins by briefly reviewing the least-cost minimization conditions facing a firm. It then links the least-cost conditions to the firm’s demand curve for an input. In doing so, the lecture derives both the firm’s and market demand curve for an input. It also derives the individual supply curve for an input and explains why the supply curve for labour is sometimes backward bending. Finally, the lecture brings together demand and supply for an input with an objective of determining the equilibrium price and quantity of inputs in a perfectly competitive market.

Lecture seven continues with the market for inputs but it relaxes the assumption of perfect competition studied in lecture six. In other words, it allows for various kind of imperfection in the product market and input markets. Three kinds of imperfection are considered. First, the lecture considers the firm that has a monopoly power in the product market but faces a competitive input market. Second, the lecture looks at a firm that has monopoly power in the product market and monopsonistic power in the input market. The third part of this lecture considers market for fixed inputs such as land. 

Lecture eight introduces the theory of general equilibrium. It commences by making a distinction between the partial and general equilibrium analysis and then presents a very simplified model of the general equilibrium analysis using comparative statics. It then states the assumptions of 2x2x2 (i.e. two individuals, two factors of production and two commodities) general equilibrium model and show how equilibria in exchange and production are attained. Finally, the lecture explains why markets fail to achieve economic efficiency as implied in general equilibrium analysis

Lecture nine focuses on welfare economics. The lecture defines welfare economics and links it with the general equilibrium model studied in the previous lecture by using the concept of Pareto optimality criterion. The lecture, too, defines and derives both the utility possibilities frontier and the grand utility possibility curve. Finally, the lecture states two fundamental theorems in welfare economics and examines some important criteria for measuring changes in social welfare.

Lecture ten introduces the theory of public goods. It defines and characterizes public goods and contrast public goods from mixed public goods and merit goods. The lecture also justifies the rationale for government intervention in providing public goods and illustrates the difference between demand curves for public goods and private goods. Finally the lecture presents the cost benefit technique and the concept of voting as alternatives approaches to price mechanism in the allocation of public goods.

The final lecture in this unit focuses on externalities. The lecture first defines the term “externality” and identifies its causes and sources. It then differentiates between private cost (benefit) and social cost (benefit). More importantly, the lecture illustrates the implication of the divergence between private and social cost in production. In doing so, the effects of externalities on production and consumption efficiency are described. Finally, the lecture outline and explain the solutions that may be used to internalize externalities.

COURSE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA  
In order to complete successfully this course, a student is required to attempt both coursework and a final examination. There will be two assignments, two tests and one final examination. The first assignment covers lectures 1-6, whereas the second assignment covers lectures 7-11. Similarly the first test will cover lectures 1-6 whereas the second test will cover lectures 7-11. At the end of the academic year you will attempt a final examination, which cover all the lectures.  
SELECTED REFERENCES
It is important to underscore that the explanation/discussion of topics provided in this reading material on its own is neither exhaustive nor does it pretend to be unique in terms of coverage. The explanation/discussion is meant to introduce you to the subject matter and open the door for further and extensive readings. Consequently, we expect that students will consult a variety of textbooks to supplement the notes contained in this reading material in order to expand their knowledge frontier. The following texts are useful throughout this course.
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In Introduction to Microeconomics I (OEC101), you have studied theories of consumer’s choice and producer's behavior separately.  In lectures one, two, three and four of this course unit, we are going to combine theories of consumers’ choice and producers behavior studied in the OEC 101 with an objective of investigating how prices and output are determined in various types of markets. In this lecture, we are going to study how price and output are determined in a perfectly competitive market. Theories of Monopoly and other types of imperfect markets will be presented in the subsequent lectures. 

Objectives of the lecture
	By the end of this lecture, you should be able to:Define perfect competitionOutline the assumptions upon which the model of perfect competition is basedShow that a firm's profit will be maximized at the point where marginal cost curve cuts the marginal revenue from belowDerive firm and industry short run supply curveIllustrate and explain the short run and long run equilibrium positions of a perfectly competitive firm and industryDescribe how the long run supply curves are derived.

1.1	Definition of Perfect Competition 

	What do economists mean by perfect competition?

Perfect competition in economic theory is used to describe a hypothetical market in which no producer or consumer has the market power to influence prices in the market. This type of market is based on the following assumptions:

(a)	The market is characterized by a large number of buyers and sellers, so that each individual seller, however large, supplies only a small part of the total quantity offered at the market. The buyers are also numerous so that no monopsonistic power can affect the working of the market.​[1]​ 













Figure 1.1:	Demand Curve of a Competitive Firm

(c)	There is a free entry and exit of the firms in the market. This assumption is supplementary to the assumption of large numbers of buyers and sellers.  If barriers exist the number of firms in the industry may be reduced so that each one of them may acquire power to affect the price in the market. 


(d)	There is free mobility of factors of production from one firm to another throughout the economy. 

(e)	There is a perfect knowledge in the sense that the market participants have a complete knowledge of the conditions prevailing on the markets. Buyers of the product are well informed about the characteristics of the product being sold and the prices charged by each firm. 

	Are these conditions realistic in the real world? If not why are we studying this model?

Having described the above five assumptions, it is obvious that there is no any industry in the real world that is perfectly competitive! Nevertheless, this does not mean that studying perfect competitive model is useless. An economic model may be quite useful no matter how pragmatic some or all of its assumptions are. The real world cannot possibly be complemented in one single step. Perfect competition assumes most of the dynamic forces as being constant and thus allows the problem of product pricing to be easily understood. Perfect competition has become a standard yardstick against which other types of market structures can be compared, evaluated and understood better

One of the major objectives of this lecture is to illustrate how the level of price and output are determined in a perfectly competitive market. We are going to illustrate the concept of output and price determination in two scenarios. In the first scenario, we will be concerned with determination of price and output at the firm level. In the second scenario, we will be looking at how prices and output are determined at the industry level. 

However, up to this stage, you should be familiar with the fact that both prices and output are determined through the interaction of market forces of demand and supply. We have already established the reasons and shape of a firm’s demand curve in figure 1.1. Our next task would be to illustrate how the supply curve of the firm is derived. This is what we show in the next section. 

 1.2	The Supply Curve of a Firm and Industry

First and foremost, we have to define the meaning of “firm” and “industry”. The term “firm” in economics is generally defined as a “unit” that employs factors of production to produce commodities that it sells/supplies to other firms, to households, or to the government. An industry is a group of firms that produce and sell/supplies a well-defined product or closely related set of products. 

	How do we derive the supply curve of a firm under perfect competitive model?
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Figure 1.2:	Supply Curve of the Firm and the Industry 

Note that if you plot the successive points of intersection of MC and the demand curves on a separate figure such as 1.2 (b), you will find that the supply curve of the individual firm is identical to its MC curve to the right of the shut down point w. Note that below Pw, the quantity supplied by the firm is zero. As soon as the price level rises above the Pw the quantity supplied increases. 

	How do we derive the industry supply?

Having derived the supply curve of a firm, our remaining task is to derive the supply curve of an industry. The industry supply curve is the horizontal summation of the supply curves of the individual firms such as the one shown in figure 1.2(b). If we assume that prices of factors of production and the level of technology are given and the number of firms is very large, then, the total quantity supplied in the market at each price is the sum of the quantity supplied by all firms at that price. It is also possible to derive the supply curve of the firm by using simple algebra. Consider the following numerical example.


Example 		Supply function of the Firm
Suppose that the firm’s cost of production in a perfectly competitive market is given as 
C=Q3-14Q2+69Q+128. Where C is the total cost and Q is the output.
(i)	Find the supply function of the firm
(ii)	If the industry consists of the 100 identical firms, each having the same cost function, find the industry’s supply curve.

Solution 
We know that in a perfectly competitive market the supply curve of a firm is identical to the marginal cost function. Therefore, we need to differentiate the above equation as follows;
	
               




The minimum of this expression can be found by calculus (or by equating Marginal cost and average variable cost since marginal cost intersects at the minimum of the average variable cost). If we equate marginal cost and average variable cost as follows; 
3Q2-28Q+69= Q2-14Q+69
 And solve for the value of output (Q);
3Q2- Q2-28Q+14Q =69-69
We get Q=7. Note also that at this value of output both marginal cost and average variable costs are equal; i.e. MC=AVC=20. Thus, the supply function is specified as;
P=69-28Q+3Q2 for P20
Q=0 for P<20
That is, the firm is willing to supply goods in the market as long as price is equal or above 20 shillings; below that price the firm will shut down. 

(b)	The industry output is Q=100q, where q is the output of each firm. Substituting q=Q/100 we have, 

For equilibrium price
Note that the quantity supplied is equal to zero when the price level is less than 20. That is, Q=0 for P<20

1.3	Short Run Equilibrium of the Firm











In figure 1.3 we show the total revenue and total cost curves of a firm in a perfectly competitive market. The total revenue curve is a straight line through the origin showing that the price is constant at all levels of output. Since, the firm is a price taker and can sell any amount of output at the going market price, with its TR increasing proportionately with sales. The slope of the TR curve is the marginal revenue, which is constant and equal to the prevailing market price, since all units are sold at the same price. Thus in perfect competition the condition MR=AR=P holds.​[2]​
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Figure 1.3:	Profit Maximization - Total Approach 

The total revenue approach is a bit problematic to use especially when firms are combined together in the study of the industry. The alternative approach, which is based on the marginal cost and marginal revenue, uses price as an explicit variable, and shows clearly the behavioral conditions that lead to profit maximization. This is what we take up in the next section. 

1.3.2	Marginal Approach
The attainment of equilibrium condition under marginal approach requires the fulfillment of two conditions. The first condition for the equilibrium of the firm is that the marginal cost be equal to the marginal revenue. However this condition is not sufficient, since it may be fulfilled and yet the firm may not be in equilibrium. In figure 1.4 we show that the condition MR=MC is satisfied at point E*, yet the firm is not in equilibrium since profit is maximized at Qe>Qe*. 












						             
							           SMC
	    		   E*			     E                
								    P =MR	
	    	




	          0	  Qe*		                 Qe      Quantity/unit of time
Figure 1.4:	Profit Maximization where MC Cuts MR Twice

	The sufficient conditions for profit maximization are:(i)	MC=MR(ii)	Slope of MC must be greater than the slope of MR.
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Figure 1.5:	Profit Maximization - Marginal Approach

The equilibrium price 0P* is equal to Short run Marginal Cost (SMC) at the equilibrium level of output Qe. The short run average total cost (SATC) at output 0Qe is Qe B. On the other hand, the total cost which is given by the average cost multiplied by quantity is thus represented by the rectangle 0ABQe. 

At the equilibrium level of output, total revenue is represented by the area of the rectangle 0P*E Qe. Thus the firm is earning revenue in excess of total costs; which  represents the supernormal profit equal to the area AP*EB. This is to be contrasted from normal profit which is the rate of return necessary to keep the factors of productions in their present use. 

	(i)	Normal profit is defined as the level of profit necessary to keep factors 	of production in their present use.(ii)	Super normal profit is defined the level of profit in excess of normal 	profit.

1.4	Short Run Profit Versus Short run Loss

	Can the firm make loss in the short run?

The fact that the firm is in the short run equilibrium does not necessarily mean that it makes excess profits. Whether the firm makes excess profits or losses depends on the position of ATC at the short run equilibrium. If the ATC is below the price at equilibrium as shown in figure 1.5, the firm earns excess profits equal to the area (P*ABE). If, however, the ATC is above the price as shown in figure 1.6, the firm makes loss equal to the area FP*EC. In the later case, the firm will continue to produce only if it covers its variable costs. Other wise, it will shut down, since by discontinuing its operations the firm is better off. 
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Figure 1.6:	Break Even and Shut-Down point 

The point at which the firm covers its variable costs is called the “shutdown point.” In figure 1.6 the shut down point is denoted by the point w. if price falls below Pw, the firm does not cover its variable costs and is better off if it shuts down.


	(i)	If, at the best level of output, P (i.e price) exceeds SATC the firm is 	maximizing 	total profits; if P is smaller than SATC but larger than 	AVC, the firm is minimizing total losses; if P is smaller than 	AVC, the firm	minimizes its total losses by shutting down.If the total cost of the firm, i.e. the fixed cost and variable costs are just being covered, then the firm is said to be breaking even and this is known as break even point (iii)	If the firm is making losses but the losses only extend to the level of 	the fixed costs, then the firm is said to be at its shut down point. 

1.5	Short Run Equilibrium of the Industry
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Figure 1.7:	Short Run Equilibrium of the Industry 

1.6	Equilibrium of the firm in the Long run
Our next task is to describe the long run equilibrium of the firm. In the long run, firms are in equilibrium when they produce at the minimum point of their long run AC curve, which is tangent (at this point) to the demand curve defined by the market price. To be noted is that firms will be earning just normal profits, which are included in the long run average cost (LAC). If firms are making excess profits, new firms will be attracted in the industry. 
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Figure 1.8:	Long Run Equilibrium of the Firm

Figure 1.8 (b) shows how firms adjust to their long run equilibrium position. If the price is P0, the firm is making excess profit working with the plant whose cost is denoted by SAC1. It will therefore have an incentive to build new capacity and it will move along its LAC. At the same time new firms will be entering in the industry attracted by the excess profits. As the quantity supplied in the market increases, the supply curve in the market will shift to the right and price will fall until it reaches the level of P* (in figure 1.8a) at which the firms and the industry are in long run equilibrium. 

The condition for the long run equilibrium of the firm is that the marginal cost be equal to the price and to the long run average cost: LMC   = LAC   = P*. Also note that at th long run equilibrium, the short run marginal cost is equal to the long run marginal cost and the short run average cost is equal to the long run average cost. Thus, given the above equilibrium condition, we have: SMC = LMC = LAC= LMC=P=MR

Example: Number of Firms in the Industry
Suppose that the market demand in a perfectly competitive industry is given by QD=70,000-5,000P and the market supply function is QS=40,000+2,500P. Assume further that the lowest point on the Long run Average Cost (LAC) of each of the many identical firms in the perfectly competitive industry is T.Shs 4.00/= and it occurs at the output of 500 units.  

(a)	Find the equation of the demand curve of the firm. 
(b)	How many firms are in this industry when in the long run equilibrium?

Solution 





In summary, the equation of demand curve for the perfectly firm in this industry is given by P=T.Shs4.00/=. That is, the firm can sell any quantity at that price. 
 






Since all firms are identical and each firm produces 500 units of output, when the industry is in the long run equilibrium, there will be 100 such firms in the industry (i.e.50, 000500=100)
1.7	Equilibrium of the Industry in the Long Run

The industry is in the long run equilibrium when firms are producing at the minimum point of the LAC as shown in figure 1.9. At the price P the industry is in equilibrium because profits are normal and all costs are covered so that there is no incentive for entry or exit. That is, the firm just earns the normal profit (neither excess profit nor losses) shown by the equality, LAC=SAC=P which is observed at the minimum point of the LAC curve (figure 1.9b). With all the firms in the industry being in equilibrium and with no entry or exit, the industry supply remains stable, and given the market demand (DD) in figure 1.9(a), the price P is a long run equilibrium price.  
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Figure 1.9:	Equilibrium of the Industry In The Long Run 

Example :	Equilibrium of the firm in the long-run




And the same long run marginal cost curve given by:

MC=0.02q-1, where q is the kilograms sold per day.

(a)	Assuming the market is in the long run equilibrium, how much kilograms will each firm sell per day?
(b)	What are the long run average cost and marginal cost at the level of output in part (a)?
The market demand for maize is given by QD=2,500,000-500,000P, where QD is the quantity demand of rice per day and P is the price of maize. 
(c)	Given your answer to part (a) what will be the price of maize in the long run equilibrium?
(d)	How many kilograms of maize will be demanded
(e)	How many firms (sellers) will be in the industry? 

Solution




























(c)	Note that the long run supply function is equal to the LMC, which is also equal to price level, i.e. P=MC;P=1
(d)	Substitute the price level (i.e.P=1) into the demand function

QD 	=	2,500,000-500,000(1) =2,000,000 kilograms

(d)	If we divide 2,000,000 by 100 kilograms supplied by each firm we should be able to get 20,000 kilograms.

1.8	Long-run Industry Supply Curve
This section illustrates how to derive the long run supply curve of an industry in a perfectly competitive market. There are two assumptions that are very important to accomplish this task. The first assumption that you have to make is that there is an increase in demand for the commodity in the market. The impact of such an increase in demand for the commodity would be to attract more firms into the industry because the price of the commodity has risen. The second assumption is that the cost of inputs required to produce the output following the entry of new firms in the industry may change or remains constant. This allows us to introduce the concepts of constant cost industry, decreasing cost industry and increasing cost industry.   


1.8.1	Constant Cost Industry 
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Figure 1.10:	Constant Cost Industry 

Assume now that the demand curve shifts from D to D1. In the short run, with the number of firms fixed, the price of the product will rise from 0P to OP1. As result, each firm will expand output from 0Q to 0Q1 and thus making economic profits since 0P1 exceeds the short run average costs of the firm at 0Q1. The consequence is that new firms will enter the industry and shift the supply curve to the right. Since output can be increased by increasing the number of firms producing OQ2 units at an average cost of 0P (the cost of inputs remains unchanged as the new firms enter the industry), the long run supply curve is horizontal at 0P. Note that the new long run equilibrium of the firm is denoted by point K.  When we join the original equilibrium Q and the new equilibrium Q2, we get the long run supply curve (LRSC), which is horizontal. 

1.8.2	Increasing Cost Industry
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Figure 1.11:	Increasing Cost Industry 
As more and more units of output are produced by the existing and new entrants, the supply curve shifts from S to S1. The price of the commodity in turns falls from P1 to P2 in order to establish the new equilibrium at Q2. When we join the original equilibrium Q and the new equilibrium Q2, we get the long run supply curve (LRSC), which is positively sloped. 

1.8.3	Decreasing Cost Industry
The decreasing cost industry occurs when the price of inputs decreases as the level of output expands. In this case, the industry long-run supply curve is negatively sloped, indicating that greater outputs per unit of time will be forthcoming in the long run at lower prices.

A decreasing cost industry is shown in figure 1.12. Once again, we begin with industry long run equilibrium.  As before, we postulate an increase in demand from D to D1, the result being an increase in price from P to P1. The increase in price would result to an increase in economic profit for established firms. Consequently, new firms are attracted in the industry. However, in the case of decreasing cost industry, the expansion of the industry output results in a decrease in the cost of established firms. This is exactly equal to saying that the cost curves shift downward; the new long run and short run average cost curves being LAC1 and SAC1. 

As more and more units of output are produced by the existing and new entrants, the supply curve shifts from S to S1. The price of the commodity in turns falls from P1 to P2 in order to establish the new equilibrium at Q2. When we join the original equilibrium Q and the new equilibrium Q2, we get the long run supply curve (LRSC), which is negatively sloped. 
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Each firm in a competitive market has an identical cost function C(q)=16+q2 , with marginal cost MC=24. The market demand function is q=24-p.

(a) 	Find the individual’s firm supply function and the market supply function 	(assuming that there are “n” many firms).

(b)	What is the condition for this market to be in the long run equilibrium?

(c)	Assuming that the market is in the long run equilibrium, how many firms are 	in this market? (Hint: first find the equilibrium price and quantity as functions 	of “n”. Then, solve for “n”).
 
(d)	Find the equilibrium price and quantity in this market




(a)	The MC=MR condition gives us an individual firm’s supply: p=2q or . Market supply is 


(b)	For market to be in the long run equilibrium (assuming free entry and exit) the market quantity supplied must equal the market quantity demanded and each firm must be earning zero profit. 







The zero profit condition says that total revenue=total cost, so:
				











(d)	Equilibrium price is  and equilibrium quantity is Q*=24-p*=16

























































In this lecture, we are going to study the theory of monopoly, which is an extreme opposite of perfect competitive model. A monopoly is a market that has one seller but many buyers. We are also going to describe how monopolist can take advantage of its control over price and how the profit maximizing price and quantity are set. The lecture will similarly compare the price and output determination between the perfect competition and monopoly market structures. 

Objectives of the lecture
	By the end of this lecture, you should be able to:(i)	Define the term "monopoly"(ii)	Explain the basis for monopoly power(iii)	Describe the shape of monopolist’s demand curve and 	marginal revenue curveDescribe the short run and long run equilibria of a monopolist(v)	Compare the long run equilibrium of perfect competition and 	that of monopoly(vi)	Explain the concept of multi-plant monopoly(vii)	Outline the conditions under which price discrimination can 	be practiced.Explain how monopoly is regulated.

2.1	Definition of Monopoly
Monopoly is a market structure where a single firm or individual produces and sells the entire output or service in a market without competition. If there are no close substitutes for the good or service in question, the firm (industry) will be able to set the level of output or the price in order to maximize profits.

	Can you identify real world examples of monopoly?

In the real world, however, most commodities have other commodities, which can substitute one another. Tanzania Electricity Company (TANESCO) for example is the sole producer of electricity in the country for both domestic and industrial uses. While the company enjoys substantial monopoly power in the industrial market for lack of substitutes for electricity, it has far less than a monopoly position in the supply for electricity for domestic use because in this market the company has to compete with sellers of generators, charcoal and firewood.  Monopoly power thus can not be absolute in the real world situation. What we have in the real world are firms which control significant part of their various markets.  

2.2	The Basis for Monopoly Power

	Why do monopolies arise?





A natural may arise in an industry a large firm with substantial economies of scale will be able to keep off potential rivals simply by selling the product at low price.​[3]​ Usually the average cost is so low that the firm can charge a low price and still earn normal profit. In this way, potential rival firms, which contemplate entering the industry with smaller scales of plant and higher average costs, will find the price already being charged by the large firm too low to cover their average variable costs. As a result, they do not enter the industry. Most natural monopolies are found in transportation, communication and public utilities like supply of electricity and water in the country. 

2.2.2	Absolute Ownership of Natural Resources

The monopolist may be the sole owner of a natural resource unless new supplies of resources are discovered; there will be no possibility of new firms entering the industry. Consequently, the monopolist will have effective control over the supply of resources and over the supply of any manufactured products derived for the resources.  Tanzania for example, has a monopoly over the precious stones called Tanzanite 

2.2.3	High Initial Cost of Establishing Plant

Some products involve very large financial outlays in the establishment of plants before production can start. This is typical of the aircraft industry in both United Kingdom and United States for example. The high cost of establishing air craft industry denies the opportunity of many developing countries in setting up such industries.  

2.2.4	Control Over the Marketing Channels

Some firms become monopolies because of their exclusive control over marketing channels for certain products. Since it is meaningless to produce a product which can not be sold, obviously potential firms which could produce the same product are forced to stay out of the industries because they will never gain access to the market.  

2.2.5	Government Licensing "Legal Monopolies"
A firm may acquire a monopoly over the production of a product by having the license on the product or on certain basic processes that are used in its production. For example, the Radio Tanzania Dar es salaam (RTD) has been given the license by the government to transmit their programs all over the country whereas other private radios are confined to specific geographical localities. 

2.2.6	Patents and Copy Rights

A monopoly may result from the holding of a patent on an invention or innovation. A patent confers the production rights for a given time periods on those who have invested in research and development to enable them recoup a return on their investments. A copyright restricts the reproduction of printed or recorded materials in similar way.

2.3	The Monopolist Demand Curve 
Since there is a single firm in the industry, the firm demand curve is also the industry demand curve. The monopolist faces the market demand curve which is normally downward sloping from left to the right indicating that in order to sell more of the products, the monopolist must lower the price and vice versa. 
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2.4	Marginal and Average Revenue Curves

	Why does the marginal revenue curve always lies below the average revenue curve under monopolist case?

In the previous lecture we showed that Average Revenue (AR) is equal to the total revenue (TR) divided by the quantity sold and so is equal to the price of the product. The demand curve can therefore be called the AR curve (see figure 2.2). Since the monopolist is usually faced with the downward sloping AR curve, she has to reduce the price of all units sold in order to sell an extra unit of output. This means that marginal revenue (MR), which is the revenue, earned by selling an extra unit, must be less than the AR or price. 

Consider data in table 2.1. Columns 1 and 2 represent the demand schedule for the product of the monopolist, say product X. Column 3 shows the total revenue obtained by multiplying together columns 1 and 2. Column 4 shows marginal revenue and it can be seen that the MR falls faster, and is less than AR.
Table 2.1:	Total, Marginal and Average Revenue
Price(T.Shs)	Quantity	Total revenue (T.Shs)	Marginal Revenue(T.Shs)	Average Revenue (T.Shs)
654321	012345	058985	-531-1-3	-54321
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Figure 2.2:	Marginal and Average Revenue  

Figure 2.2 above illustrates the relationship among the Total, Average and Marginal Revenue for the data presented in table 2.1. If the demand curve is written so that price is a function of quantity, P = - Q, then the total revenue received PQ is given by PQ = Q - Q2. The marginal revenue curve can be obtained by using calculus, because marginal revenue is associated with a change in quantity. Thus, marginal revenue d (PQ)/dQ =  - 2Q. 

Figure 2.2 shows that as we move down the demand curve, price falls and quantity rises. Total revenue can either increase or decrease depending on the price elasticity of demand. If demand is elastic, marginal revenue is positive, because increasing output also increases revenue. If demand is inelastic, an increase in output reduces revenue. It is easy to show the relationship between marginal revenue (MR) and price elasticity , using calculus. Because total revenue is PQ, marginal revenue is determined by calculating the change in PQ with respect to an increase in quantity: 
MR = d [PQ]/dQ = P +Q [dP/dQ]. 
Multiplying and dividing the last term on the right of the equal sign by P yields,
 MR = P + P [Q/P][dP/dQ]. 
Finally, substituting for the price elasticity yields; 
MR = P [1 - 1/]. 




2.5	Short Run Equilibrium of a Monopolist

Like in the perfect competitive model, the equilibrium of the firm may be illustrated in two approaches. These are;
(i)	Total Revenue (TR) and Total Cost (TC) approach  




The short run equilibrium of the firm occurs at the point where difference between total revenue (TR) and total cost (TC) is largest compared to other points. Consider table 2.2, which gives hypothetical total revenue and total cost data. You can easily see from the table that total revenue (column 3) minus total cost (column 4) gives total profit (column 5). Total profits are maximized at T.Shs 3.75 and the monopolist is in the short run equilibrium when the monopolist produces and sells 2.5 units of the commodity per period of time at the price of T.Shs 5.50.

Table 2.2:	Profit Maximization- Total Approach 
Price (T.Shs)	Quantity	Total Revenue	Total Cost	Total Profits
8.007.006.005.50*5.004.003.00	0122.5345	07.0012.0013.7515.0016.0015.00	68910122035	-6.00-1.00+3.00+3.75+3.00-4.00-20.00
 





It is much more easier to analyze the short run equilibrium of the monopolist by using the marginal approach. The monopolist maximizes his short run profit if the following two conditions are fulfilled:
(i)	The MC curve is equal to the MR curve. 
(ii)	The slope of MC is greater than the slope of the MR at the point of intersection. (i.e. MC must be rising)
          Price 
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			    Q	       MR
Note; 	SMC = Short run Marginal Cost
	SAC = Short run Average Cost
	MR = Marginal Revenue 

Figure 2.3:	Equilibrium of the Monopolist in the Short Run 

In figure 2.3 the equilibrium of monopolist is defined by point E, at which the marginal cost intersects the marginal revenue curve from below. At this equilibrium, price is P and the quantity is Q. The monopolist realizes excess profit equal to the shaded area APCB. 

Numerical Example on the Equilibrium of the Monopolist

Suppose that the demand curve of a monopolist is given by Q=50-0.5P and the Total Cost function is specified as C=50+40Q.
(i)	Find the output level that maximizes profit
(ii)	Obtain the price charged by the monopolist at the profit maximizing output
(iii) 	Determine the monopolist profit.

Solution
(a)	Up until now, we know that the monopolist sets the output level where the 	marginal cost is equal to the marginal revenue. Thus, our task here is to find out 	the marginal revenue and marginal cost functions by using calculus.

	We know that Marginal revenue =
	Where, TR is Total Revenue and Q is the output level.
	But, what is TR? It is simply a price times output (PxQ)
	Note that our demand function can also be written as P=100-2Q.







We also know that 
Marginal cost 	=dTC/dQ; where TC and Q denote cost and output   respectively.
	 		=	40













The profit is the maximum possible since the second order-condition is satisfied. Can you prove?
	
	Can monopolist set output and price decision independently? 

The firm operating under monopoly market is usually faced with two decisions:
(i)	The first decision is concerned with setting the price. 
(ii)	The second decision is concerned with setting the level of output. However, given the downward sloping demand curve, the two decisions are not mutually exclusive. The monopolist will either set his price or sell the amount that the market will take it, or he will produce the output defined by the intersection of MC and MR, which will be sold at the corresponding price P. The monopolist cannot decide independently both the quantity and the price at which he wants to sell it. The crucial condition for the maximization of the monopolist’s profit is the equality of his MC and MR, provided that the MC cuts the MR from below.    

	Can monopolist make loss or break even in the short run? 
  	
2.6 	Monopolist Supply Curve
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Figure 2.4:	Absence of Supply Curve under Monopoly 

	Can you draw the figure, which shows absence of supply curve under monopoly when the monopolist firm charges the same level of price at two different levels of output?

	In monopoly, there is no unique relation between the market price and the quantity supplied. This is because the monopolist equates his marginal cost to his marginal revenue; but his marginal revenue is not equal to the price. Hence, the monopolist will not equate his marginal cost to price in order to derive the supply curve as we described in the case of perfect competition.  
2.7	Long Run Equilibrium of the Monopolist






		          SMC      LMC
     P		      A	SAC	
     E			                LAC
                         B
    D

O		 Q	 MR			Quantity
Figure 2.5:	Monopolist with Excess Capacity 

Note that;
	LAC = Long run Average Cost
	SAC= Short run Average Cost
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Figure 2.6:	Monopolist with Full Capacity 

2.8	Monopoly and Perfect Competition: A comparison





The products sold in the market are homogeneous in perfect competition. In monopoly the product may or may not be homogeneous. The main feature of monopoly is that the total supply of the product is concentrated in a single firm.

In perfect competition there is a large number of sellers, so that each one cannot affect the market price by changing his supply. In monopoly there is a single seller in the market.  In perfect competition entry and exit is free in the sense that there are no barriers to entry. In monopoly, barriers exist.

The assumption of large numbers of buyers and sellers and that of homogeneous product implies that the demand curve in perfect competition is perfectly elastic. However, in monopoly, the demand curve of the firm, which is also the demand curve for the industry, is negatively sloped. 

The only decision of the firm in perfect competition is determination of its output since prices are given. In the monopoly, however, a firm can determine either the level of output or price, but not both. 

In both markets, the decisions are taken by applying the rule that Marginal Revenue equals Marginal Cost, although in monopoly marginal cost is not equal to price level as in the case of perfect competition. 

2.8.2	Comparison of Long Run Equilibrium

The most striking comparison between perfect competition and monopoly entails the use graphical analysis.  In short, the level of output under monopoly is always lower while the price charged is higher compared with perfect competition. This is due to the fact that in perfect competition a firm produces at minimum point of Long run Average Cost curve (LAC) and earns just a normal profit, while the monopolist usually earns abnormal profits even in the long run. 

Figure 2.7 illustrates that the monopolist charges Pm and supplies Qm. Perfect competitor firm charges price (Ppc) at the level of output (Qpc). The area ABC represents the dead weight loss. By dead weight loss we mean a net fall in welfare as a result of monopolist restriction in output. As you can see from figure 2.7, in perfect competition there is no abnormal profit in the long run. In monopoly, abnormal profits are usually earned both in the short run and in the long run.
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A monopolist can produce at a constant average and marginal costs of AC=MC=5. The firm faces a market demand curve given by Q=53-P. The Monopolist’s marginal revenue curve is given by MR=53-2Q.

(a)	Find the profit –maximizing quantity combination for the monopolist
(b)	Calculate the consumer’s surplus
(c)	Find the level of output that would have been produced if this industry had to operate under perfect competition
(d)	Calculate the consumer’s surplus in part (c)
(e)	Show that the consumer surplus obtained in part (d) exceeds the sum of monopolist profits (part a) and consumer surplus obtained in part (b)




(a)	For a maximum profit, set the marginal revenue and marginal cost condition MR=MC. We have been given the marginal cost. Now we need to find the marginal revenue, which is nothing but the change in total revenue resulting from change in one additional unit of output sold. 

Total revenue is obtained by multiplying price and quantity. Since we have a quantity as Q=53-P, then total revenue is given as;  
TR=PQ=53Q-Q2
Thus, marginal revenue is given as;
MR=53-2Q
So, by equating the marginal revenue and marginal cost, we should be able to get the following:
Q=24, P=29
Algebraically, profit is defined as : 
 = TR	-TC
 				   =24x29-24.5
   				 = 696-120
   				 = 576
So, 576 is the maximum profit. 

(b)	Consumer surplus
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(c)	The level of output that would be produced under a perfectly competitive market is given as follows;
MC=P=5, 
So, if P=5 then Q=48. This is the level of output that would have been produced if the industry had to operate under perfect competition.
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It is obvious that 1152>864

	(f)	Dead weight loss	=	1152-864=288




	Dead weight loss refers to the net fall in welfare as a result of monopolist restriction in output.

2.9	The Multi Plant Firm

This section describes the case of a monopolist who produces a homogenous product in different plants. Although we are going to restrict the analysis into two plants for the sake of simplicity, you should be aware of the fact that the analysis might easily be generalized to any number of plants.	
  
	Multi plant firms refers to the existence of a monopolist who produces homogeneous products in different plants.

Assume for simplicity that the monopolist operates two plants, A and B, each with a different cost structure as shown in figure 2.8(a) and 2.8(b). The monopolist has to make two decisions. These are;
(i)	How much output to produce altogether and at what price to sell it so as to maximize profits.
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Figure 2.8:	Multi Plant Firm  








Numerical example: Multi plant Monopoly

Assume that the monopolist’s demand curve is Q=200-2P. Suppose that the cost of two plants are; TC1=10Q1 and TC2=0.25Q22.
(a)	Find the level of output maximizing profit in each plant
(b)	What is the level of output maximizing profit in both plants?
(c)	Calculate the monopolist maximum profit.
Solution
(a)	The goal of the monopolist is to maximize profit. The profit equation in this problem is given as; 
   =	TR  -  TC1 -  TC2
Where; TR =Total Revenue
	TC1=Total Cost in plant 1
	TC2=Total Cost in plant 2
But, what is the total revenue? It is simply price times output. We may thus write the Total Revenue function as follows;
	TR  = Q (100-0.5Q)
	       =100Q-0.5Q2.
As usual, we apply calculus to solve for marginal revenue equation.
	MR=dTR/dQ=100-Q=100-( Q1+Q2)

Note that Q=Q1+Q2. Why? Because Q is the output level produced in both plants. The logic behind here is that we want to compute marginal revenue function in each plant. 






The next task is to equate marginal revenue and marginal cost in each plant in order to solve for the profit maximizing output. 

100-Q1-Q2=10, for plant 1
100-Q1-Q2=0.5Q2 for plant 2

Solving for Q1 and Q2 simultaneously we find
	Q1=70 and Q2=20

(b)	The total output in both plants is 70+20=90. This is the output that will be sold at price defined by P=100-0.5(90)=55 
(c)	The maximum profit is
	= TR – TC1-TC2
	=4950-10(70)-0.25(400)
	=4150.
This is the maximum profit. Can you prove?

2.10	Price Discrimination 
	What do we mean by the term “price discrimination”?

Price discrimination occurs when the monopolist charges different price to different consumer of similar goods and services in different markets and in this way increase total profit. The markets may be separated from each other in a number of different ways. 

First, the market may be separated geographically, as when the exporter charges a different price in the overseas market than in the home market.  

Secondly, the market may be separated by the type of demand, as in the market for electricity where the household demand for electricity differs from the industrial demand for electricity. 

Thirdly, market may be separated by time, as with telephone companies among others, where a lower price is charged in off peak periods. 

Finally, the monopolist must be able to prevent the resale of the product; otherwise, the purchaser at the lower price might sell directly to other customers. The markets may be separated by the nature of the product, as with medical treatment where if one person is treated that person is unable to resell that treatment to another. 

2.10.1	First Degree Price Discrimination
In this case, the monopolist charges the highest price that the consumer is willing to pay for each unit sold. In first degree price discrimination, price varies by customer. This arises from the fact that the value of goods is subjective. A customer with low price elasticity is less deterred by a higher price than a customer with high price elasticity of demand. As long as the price elasticity (in absolute value) for a customer is less than one, it is very advantageous to increase the price: the seller gets more money for fewer goods. With an increase of the price the price elasticity tends to rise above one.






This involves charging different prices for different blocks of consumption. The aim of monopolist, say a public utility company, is to charge a relatively high price for the first block of consumption, a lower price for the next block and so on. Second degree price discrimination is shown in figure 2.9 in which the demand curve for a product is given by DD. 
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Figure 2.9:	Second Degree Price Discrimination 
      
The monopolist charges OP1 for units up to quantity OQ1. For units above OQ1 but below OQ2, the monopolist charges price OP2. For units above OQ2 but below OQ3, the monopolist charges price OP3. In this way, the monopolist is able to get more of the consumer surplus compared with the alternative case of charging a single price. In this case, the discriminating monopolist earns total revenue given by the areas of OP1AQ1 +Q1BCQ2+Q2FEQ3 for selling output OQ3. If this monopolist had not applied the second degree of price discrimination, the area OP3EQ3 would give the revenue earned.





Suppose that the monopolist faces a demand curve given by the following equation: QD=12-P
(a)	What is the monopolist total revenue upon selling six units of the commodity?

(b)	What is the total revenue if the monopolist practiced first degree of price discrimination?

(c)	If the monopolist sold the first three units of the commodity at a price of T.Shs 9.00/= per unit and the rest of three units at a price of T.Shs 6.00/=per units, how much of the consumer’s surplus would monopolist take? What type of price discrimination is this? Why?

Solution




As usual, total revenue is given by multiplying the price and quantity. That is, 
TR=PQ=6x6=36
We can plot the monopolist demand curve as follows;
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(b)	If the monopolist practiced first degree of price discrimination, Total revenue would be T.Shs 54.00/=, given by the area ABCO of which triangle ABF is the consumers’ surplus. 

Area ABCO = Area ABF+ Area BCOF
=½ x 6x6+36
=T.Shs 54.00/=
This represents the maximum that the consumers are willing to make to get six units of this commodity rather than forgo entirely the consumption of this commodity.  

(c)	TR=3(9)+3(6)=T.Shs 45.00/=. Hence the monopolist would take half of the consumer’s surplus. This is the second degree of price discrimination, where the monopolist sets uniform price per unit for specific quantity of the commodity, a lower price per unit for a specific batch of the commodity and so on. 

2.10.3	Third degree price discrimination
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Figure 2.10:	Third Degree of Price Discrimination  





	Why and how should monopoly be regulated?

Because of the amount of discretion a monopolist has in the setting the price of his product, it is likely that the monopolist will be reaping very high economic profits and the government may find it necessary to regulate their activities.

2.11.1 	 Average Cost Pricing

By setting a minimum price at the level where the Short run Marginal Cost (SMC) curve cuts demand curve D, the government can induce the monopolist to increase his output to the level where the industry would have produced if organized along the perfectly competitive lines. This also reduces the monopolist profit.
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Where ; P is price and Q is quantity. The subscripts and stands for regulation and monopoly respectively.
Figure 2.11:	Price Control  





2.11.2	 Per Unit Tax 

The government can also reduce the monopolist's profit by imposing a per unit tax. However, in this case the monopolist will be able to shift part of the burden of the per unit tax to the consumers in the form of higher price and smaller output of the commodity.
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Figure 2.12:	Per Unit Tax  

Before the imposition of tax, the monopolist's average cost is given by the curve AC* with the corresponding marginal cost given by short run marginal cost SMC*. Note that the monopolist is able to sell Q* units of output at price P* and the economic profit is represented by the shaded area. Per unit tax on monopolist product will shift the average and marginal cost curves upwards to AC1 and SMC1 respectively.  The monopolist now reduces his output to Q1 and increases the price to P1. Economic profit has been taken away by the government and the monopolist is earning zero economic profit. 

Numerical Example: The effect of tax monopoly
Suppose that a monopolist firm has a demand function given by: P= 15-0.05Q. Assume further that the total cost function of the monopolist is given by: TC=Q+0.02Q2. 

(a)	Find the point of profit maximization
(b)	Find maximum profit if a T.Shs 1.00/= per unit tax is imposed by the government.
Solution

(a)	As usual, a monopolist maximizes profits when MR=MC. Now, we have to solve for the marginal revenue and marginal cost, just as we have been doing in the previous examples.

Since demand is given by P=15-0.05Q. Total Revenue (PxQ) = (15-0.05Q) Q 
TR=15Q-0.05Q2
Marginal revenue is nothing other than change in total revenue resulting from change in one unit of output sold. In this context, it is given as; 
MR=15-0.1Q
Analogously, the marginal cost is nothing other than the change in total cost resulting from employing one additional unit of input; it is given as;  
MC=1+0.04Q
	Then, we equate MC and MR
	15-0.1Q=1+0.04Q
	Q*=100, P*=10
Thus, Q*=100 and P*=10 are profit maximizing output and price respectively. 

 (b)	Now we include a T.Shs 1.00/= unit tax in our total cost function. 
TC=Q+0.02Q2+tax
Since tax =T.Shs1.00/= per unit and we sell Q units then tax is Q. 
Therefore, TC (Tax)=Q+0.02Q2+Q or 2Q+0.02Q2
Solving for Marginal Cost, we get 2+0.04Q
Solving for Marginal Revenue, we get 15-0.1Q

























	1.	Monopoly is a market structure in which there is a single seller, 	there are no close substitutes for the commodity it produces and 	there are barriers to entry. The basis of monopoly are; natural monopoly, absolute ownership of strategic raw materials, high initial cost of establishing the plant, control over the marketing channels and government licensing. 3.	The monopolist maximizes his short run profit if the following 	two conditions are fulfilled: firstly, the MC curve is 	equal 	to the 	MR curve. Secondly, the slope of MC is greater than the slope of 	the MR at the point of intersection.4.	In monopoly, there is no unique relation between the market price 	and the quantity supplied. This is because the monopolist equates 	his marginal cost to his marginal revenue; but his marginal 	revenue is not equal to the price. Hence, the monopolist will not 	equate his marginal cost to price in order to derive the supply 	curve as we described in the case of perfect competition5.	Price discrimination occurs when the monopolist charges different 	price to different consumer of similar goods and services in 	different markets. In the first-degree of price discrimination, the 	monopolist charges the highest price that the consumer is willing 	to pay for each unit sold. Second degree of price discrimination 	involves charging different prices for different blocks of 	consumption. 	In the third degree of price discrimination, the 	monopolist is able to 	separate two or more markets with 	differing elasticities of demand and charge different price in the 	separate markets6.	By setting minimum price at the level where short run marginal 	cost 	cuts the demand curve, the government can induce the 	monopolist to 	increase his output level where the industry would 	have produced	if organized along the perfectly competitive lines. 7.	The government can also reduce the monopolist’s profit by 	imposing per unit tax. However, in this case the monopolist will 	be able to shift part of the burden of the per unit tax to the 	consumers in 	the form of higher prices and smaller output.
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The theories of perfect competition and monopoly market structures were dominant for analysis price and output determination up to the early 1920s. In the late 1920s, however, economists felt increasingly disenchanted with the use of perfect competition as analytical device of business behavior because it could not explain several empirical facts. For example, the assumptions of product homogeneity and perfect information could no longer fit the real world. On the other hand, monopoly market in the real world is hard to find.

In response to the above challenges, one of the most path-breaking contributions was the theory of "monopolistic competition" pioneered by Edward Chamberlin of Harvard University.  In this lecture, we present a simplified theory of monopolistic competition, which unquestionably has had an important impact in the development of microeconomic theory. 

Objectives of the lecture
	By the end of this lecture, you should be able to:(i)	Define the term “monopolistic competition”(ii)	Outline the assumptions of the monopolistic competition(iii)	Explain the importance of product differentiation in the theory 	of monopolistic competitionIllustrate the short run and long run equilibrium under monopolistic competitionCompare the long run equilibrium of perfect competition and that of monopolistic competitionProvide a critique on the theory of monopolistic competition

3.1	Definition of Monopolistic Competition

	What is monopolistic competition? How does it differ from monopoly ?

Monopolistic competition refers to the market organization in which there are many firms selling closely related but not identical products.  A good example is given by the many headache remedies available in the chemists (e.g., Hedex, Paracetamol, etc.). Another example is given by the many different makes of cars on the market (e.g., Rolls Royce, Bentley, Cadillac, Jaguar, Mercedes Benz, BMW, Lexus, etc). Because of this product differentiation, the seller has some degree of control over the price he charges and thus faces a negatively slope demand curve. However, the existence of many close substitutes severely limits his “monopoly” power and result in a highly elastic demand curve as depicted in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1:	Monopolistic firm’s Demand Curve 

	Is it possible to construct an industry demand and supply curves under monopolistic competition?
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Figure 3.2:	Absence of an Industry Demand Curve 
It is not possible to construct both demand and supply curve under monopolistic competition because of product differentiation. The assumption of product differentiation (see section 3.2) implies that there will be a cluster of prices rather than a single price for differentiated products sold by the firm as depicted in figure 3.2.

Note that while “dd” is a monopolistic firm demand curve, DD is the demand curve of other firms. Now, when a firm in figure 3.2 reduces its price form let say P2 to P1, its sales increases from Q1 to Q3 units. This is represented by a movement from point A to point B along the demand curve dd. However, if all other firms in this same industry also reduce their prices, from let say P2 to P1, the sale will increase from Q1 to Q2 units, rather than from Q1 to Q3 units. This is represented by the movement from point A to C along the demand curve DD. Therefore, in the theory of monopolistic competition we must confine our diagrammatic analysis to a single firm rather than the entire industry. 

3.2	Assumptions of the Monopolistic Competition 
The theory of monopolist competition is based on the following assumptions;
(a)	The industry is characterized by large number of buyers and sellers
(b)	Each firm in monopolistic industry produces one specific brand of the industry’s differentiated products. As a result, each firm faces a demand curve that although negatively sloped is highly elastic because of the many close substitutes, which are sold by other firms. 
(c)	The industry contains many firms and each firm ignores the possible reactions of its competitors when it makes its own price and output decisions. The decisions are based on the own firm’s demand curve and its corresponding cost conditions. 




Product differentiation is intended to distinguish the product of one producer from that of the other producers in the industry. Product differentiation may be in the form of designing, packaging, brand name or advertising. Whatever the case, the aim of product differentiation is to make the product unique in the mind of consumers. The effect of product differentiation is that producer has some discretion in the determination of price. He is not the price taker, but has some degree of monopoly power which he can exploit. However, he faces the keen competition of close substitutes offered by other firms. This is why the monopolistic competitor demand curve is more elastic (less steeply sloped, see figure 3.1) than the demand curve for the product of the monopoly.

	Differentiated products are goods and services whose perceived or actual attributes vary enough so that consumers can distinguish product form each other.
 
3.4	Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short Run

All firms, regardless of their industry structure, will maximize profit in the short run by producing the level of output where marginal revenue is equal to the short run marginal cost, as long as price is at least sufficiently high to cover average variable cost. Figure 3.3 shows that the monopolistic competitive firm attains equilibrium at point Q*. 
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Figure 3.3:	Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short run  

Since the price exceeds the average cost, the firm earns a profit as shown by the shaded rectangle in the figure 3.3.  A firm may earn an economic profit or loss depending on the structure of cost curves as we have discussed in lecture two. 

3.5	Equilibrium of the Firm in the long run 
In the long run the monopolistically competitive firm will maximize profit by producing the level of output where marginal revenue is equal to the long run marginal cost, as long as price is least as great as long run average cost. If the price is less than the average cost, the firm should leave the industry. What we are assuming here is that the firm can vary its factors of production so that it has a combination of inputs that will enable it to produce its output at the lowest possible cost.
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Figure 3.4:	Equilibrium of the Firm in the long run  
 3.6	Long run Industry Equilibrium
When firms in a monopolistically competitive industry are earning an economic profit, other firms are attracted in the industry. The entry of new firms result in a smaller market share for each firm. In this case, the demand curves of firms already in the industry shift downward.	
	Price

                                                             LMC               
                                                                                    LAC





    AR=D

      MR
                          
                             O  		       Qe				Quantity of output
Figure 3.5:	firm in the long run industry equilibrium  


The monopolistically competitive industry will reach a long run equilibrium position when each firm is in the situation shown in figure 3.5. At this particular situation, price is equal to long run average cost at the profit maximizing level of output, so that each firm is earning only a normal profit. 

Figure 3.5 shows that the monopolistically competitive firm will maximize its profit in the long run by producing where marginal revenue (MR) is equal to the long run marginal cost (LMC), as long as it is receiving at least normal profit. In addition, price is equal to long run average cost. In short, figure 3.5 tells us that there is no incentive for firms to enter or leave the industry.

3.7	Comparison with Perfect Competition and Monopoly
As you may now be well aware, perfect competitive markets are desirable because they are economically efficient as long as nothing impedes the working of the markets. Monopolistic competition is similar to competition in some respect but it is not efficient for at least two major reasons. 
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Figure 3.6:	Monopolistic Competition and Perfect Competition 

Second, note in figure 3.6(b) that monopolistically competitive firm operates with excess capacity. By excess capacity, we mean that the output level produced by the monopolistically competitive firm is smaller than the level of output that would minimize average cost. That is, Qc is the output under the perfect competition; Qmc is the output under monopolistic competition. It is obvious that Qmc is less than Qc.

Third, although the entry of new firms drives profits to zero (i.e. break even) in both perfectly competitive and monopolistic competitive markets, it is important to be clear that the lowest point at which the average cost intersect with marginal cost occur in different positions. In a perfectly competitive market, each firm faces a horizontal demand curve, so the profit point occurs at minimum average cost, as figure 3.6(a) shows. In a monopolistically competitive market, however, the demand curve is downward sloping, so that the zero-profit point occurs to the left of minimum average cost (see figure 3.6(b)). 


	Is monopolistic competition a socially undesirable market structure that should be regulated?

The answer to the above question is probably not, for at least two main reasons. First, in most monopolistically competitive markets, monopoly power is small. Usually, a large number of firms compete, with brands that are sufficiently substitutable for one another, so that no single firm will have substantial monopoly power. Therefore, any deadweight loss from monopoly power should also be small. And because firm’s demand curves will be fairly elastic, the excess capacity will be small too. 

Second, monopolistic competition provides consumers with the benefit of product diversity. Most consumers do value the ability to choose among a wide variety of competing products and brands that differ in various ways. The gains from product diversity can be large and may easily overwhelm the inefficiency costs resulting from down ward sloping demand curve. 

3.8	Criticisms of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition

Some economists claim that there are relatively few markets in the real world where the model of monopolistic competition is really relevant. It has been attacked on several grounds. We mention a few criticisms here;

(i)	The assumptions of product differentiation and of independent action by the competitors are inconsistent. It is a fact that the firms are continuously aware of the actions of competitors whose products are close substitutes of their own product.

(ii)	The assumption of product differentiation is also incompatible with the assumption of free entry, especially if the entrants are completely new firms. A new firm must advertise substantially and adopt intensive selling campaigns in order to make its products known and attract customers from already established firms. Product differentiation and loyalty of buyers create a barrier to entry for new firms.

(iii)	The model assumes a large number of sellers. But it does not define the actual number of firms necessary to justify the myopic disregard of competitor actions. How many firms should there be in an industry in order to classify it as monopolistically competitive rather than oligopoly? 

































In lecture three, you have learned a theory of monopolistic competition. However, many markets that appear to be monopolistically competitive are in reality dominated by a few major producers who can manufacture a large number of different brands. These markets are described as Oligopolies. 
 
In a typical oligopolistic market, usually the number of firms is small enough for each seller to take into consideration actions of the other seller in the market. As a result, sellers recognize that they are mutually interdependent. The recognition of oligopolistic interdependence means that a comprehensive theory of oligopoly would have to take into account oligopolist’s view of how rivals would react to any price or output variations in the market. Because of uncertainties involved, there is no satisfactory theory of oligopoly. 

In this lecture, we are going to study oligopoly in two major parts. In the first part, we are going to study non-collusive models of oligopolies. In the second part, we are going to study models of collusive oligopolies. 

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture, you should be able to:Define oligopoly and duopolyOutline the basis for oligopolyClassify different types of oligopolyExplain and describe the models of non collusive oligopoly such as Cournot, Betrand and Kinked demand curve modelsExplain and describe the models of collusive oligopoly such as cartel, market sharing and price leadership models.

4.1	Definition of Oligopoly 

Oligopoly is defined as market structure characterized by a small number of firms and great deal of interdependence, which may be actual or perceived by firms. Each oligopolist formulates his policies with a vigilant eye to the effect of those policies into his rivals. That is to say, since an oligopoly contains a small number of firms, any change in the firm’s price or output decision do exert a considerable influences the sales and profits of competitors. 

	The special case of a market dominated by two firms is called duopoly.

4.1.1	The Basis for Oligopoly

There are several reasons, which may lead to the existence of oligopoly. The first one is connected to the economies of scale. That is, lower costs arising from the expansion of production. In some industries, low costs cannot be achieved unless a firm is producing an output equal to a substantial percentage of the total available market, the consequences being that the number of firms will tend to be rather small. In addition, there may be economies of scale in sales promotion as well as in production, which may in turn promote oligopoly. 

Secondly, there may be barriers that make it difficult to enter the industry. Such barriers include smallness of the market and unavailability of natural resources, patents and government intervention. Most of these barriers are similar to those we saw under the monopoly market structure in lecture two. 

4.1.2	Classification of Oligopoly 

Oligopolistic industries can be classified in two major groups. The first group involves firms that produce homogeneous products. This group is called pure oligopoly. The second group involves firms that produce differentiated products. This group is called differentiated oligopoly. 

In this lecture, however, we are going to concentrate on pure oligopoly, which is divided into two groups: non-collusive and collusive oligopolies. Non collusive oligopoly occurs when oligopolists operate individually whereas collusive oligopoly occurs when oligopolists enter into a formal agreement to share the market.    

4.2	Non Collusive Oligopoly 






The Cournot model describes the cases of two firms, which sell spring water, the cost of production being zero for each firm.​[4]​ The Cournot model is based on the following assumptions;
(i)	There are two firms; firm A and firm B
(ii)	Both firms produce homogeneous product
(iii)	Both firms are aware of the demand curve for their product, which is supposed to be linear
(iv)	Each firm assumes that, regardless of what output it produces, the other firm will hold its output constant.   
It is important to point out that there are various versions of the Cournot Model that have been written by many different authors. Some of those versions are more difficult to comprehend at the introductory level. Although the textbook treatment of the Cournot model differs from one textbook to another in terms of graphical analysis, the overall objective of all textbooks is to illustrate how price and output are determined in the Cournot setting. So, students should not worry much about the graphical treatment. Instead, student should strive to understand how price and output are determined in the Cournot model.  

After putting the above caveat into our mind, we can now use figure 4.1 to describe the behaviour of two firms (A and B) in the Cournot model. The horizontal axis in figure 4.1 shows the price charged by the firms and the horizontal axis shows the quantity of spring water produced by the two firms.
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Figure 4.1:	Cournot Model 

Assume that firm A is the first to start producing and selling spring water. In figure 4.1, we show that firm A will produce quantity QA at a price P where profits are maximum. You should note that at QA profits are maximized by firm A because marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue (i.e. MC=MR=0). Why is this so? Remember Cournot assumes that firms operate with zero cost. 

	What do you think will happen to firm B?

By the same logic, firm B assumes that firm A will keep its output fixed at (0QA) as shown in figure 4.1 which is just a half of the total demand curve DD*. This will make firm B to regard its own demand curve as the other half of the demand curve DD* depicted by the segment CD*. It follows therefore that, firm B will produce half the quantity AD* say at QB where profit is at maximum (MR=MC=0). In other words, firm B produces half of the market, which has not been supplied by firm A equals to ¼ or (=½x½).

In the second round, firm A assumes that firm B will keep his quantity constant. So, firm A will produce one-half of the market, which is not supplied by B. But, since firm B covers one quarter of the market, firm A will produce ½(1-¼) =3/8 of the total market. Again, firm B will react to firm A and produces one-half of the section not supplied in the market. That is, ½(1-3/8) = 5/16.

In the third round, firm A will continue to assume that firm B will not change its quantity, and thus will produce one-half of the remainder of the market. That is, ½(1-5/16). This action –reaction pattern will continue since firms have naïve behavior of not learning past pattern of reaction of their rival. 
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Figure 4.2:	Cournot Equilibrium

Figure 4.2 shows the output produced by firm  in the vertical axis and the output produced by firmon the horizontal axis. As explained before, the reaction function for firm shows how its optimal output varies with the output it assumes firmwill make and sell. Since firms are similar in the Cournot model, the reaction function form firm  shows the best output of firmgiven the assumed output of firm. 

The Cournot equilibrium also known as “Nash equilibrium” is determined by the intersection of the two reaction curves—given by point. It is a stable equilibrium, provided that ’s reaction curve is steeper than ’s reaction curve as shown in the figure above. 

Example 	 Cournot solution
Suppose two identical firms in duopolistic market face the following linear demand curve specified as;
P = 30 – Q								   (4.1)
Where Q is the total output of both firms; i.e. (Q = Q1+Q2). Also suppose that both firms have zero marginal cost specified as;
		MC1 = MC2 = 0 							   (4.2)
Then, we can determine the reaction curve for firm 1 as follows. To maximize profit, the firm sets marginal revenue equal to the marginal cost. Firm1 total revenue (TR) is given by;
		TR1 = PQ1 = 	(30 – Q) Q1
			      =	30Q1 – (Q1 +Q2)Q1
			      =	30Q1-Q12 – Q2Q1 					   (4.3)
The firm’s marginal revenue MR1 is just the change in total revenue (TR1), resulting from change in total output. 


Now, if we set MR1 to be equal to zero (the firm’s marginal cost) and solving for Q we find firm 1’ reaction curve which can be written as;
	Q1 = 15 – ½ Q2 								(4.5)
 You can go through the same procedure and be able to get firm 2’ reaction curve written in equation (4.6)
	Q2 = 15 – ½ Q1                         						(4.6)

The equilibrium output levels are the values for Q1 and Q2 that are at the intersection of the two reaction curves. In other words, if we substitute equation 4.6 into equation 4.5 you can verify the equilibrium output levels as Q1 =Q2=10. The total quantity of output produced is thus Q1+ Q2. So the equilibrium market price is P = 30 –Q = 10, since Q =20.

4.2.3	The Betrand Model
This model was developed by French Economist Joseph Betrand in 1883. Like the Cournot model, the Betrand model assumes that firms produce homogeneous commodities and make their decision at the same time. However, unlike the Cournot model, Betrand model assumes that duopolists firms choose price rather than quantity as a strategic variable. In simple words, Betrand model is a model of price competition between duopolists firms rather than quantity competition. As shown below, this change in assumption can dramatically affect the market outcome. For simplicity, let us go back the numerical example 4.1 in which the market demand curve is given as:

P = 30 – Q								   (4.7)

Where Q is the total output of both firms; i.e. (Q = Q1+Q2). This time, however, we assume that each firm has a marginal cost of T.Shs 3/=

 	MC1 = MC2 = 3 							 	  (4.8)

As an exercise, you can show that the Cournot equilibrium for this duopoly, which results when both firms chooses output simultaneously, is Q1=Q2=9. Also, you can check that in this Cournot equilibrium, the market price is T.Shs 12, so that each firm makes a profit of T.Shs 81.

Suppose that our duopolists compete simultaneously by choosing a price instead of quantity. What level of price would each firm choose? And how much profit would each firm earn? Note that because the commodity produced by these two firms is homogenous, consumer will purchase the commodity at the firm with the lowest price. Thus, if the two firms charge different prices, the lower-price firm will supply the entire market and the higher price firm will sell nothing. If both firms charge the same level of price, consumers will be indifferent as to which firm would they buy from and each firm will supply half of the market. 

The lowest possible price that each firm would choose is T.Shs 3. Note that this is a price that a firm in perfect competition would choose. If both firms set the price to marginal cost: P1=P2=3, then the industry output would be 27 units, of which each firm produces 13.5 units. And because price equals marginal cost, both firms earn zero profits (see lecture one). 

By changing the choice variable from output to price, we get a different outcome. Because each firm in the Cournot model produces only 9 units, the market price is T.Shs 12.  In the Cournot model, each firm made a profit; in the Betrand model, however, firms do not make profit because price is equal to marginal cost.  

The Betrand Model has been criticized on several grounds. First, when firms produce homogeneous commodities it is natural to compete by setting quantities rather than prices. Second, even if firms do set prices and chooses the same prices (as the model predicts), the model does not explain the distribution of the share of total sales that goes to each firm. Despite these shortcomings, the Betrand model is useful in that it shows how the equilibrium outcome in an oligopoly can depend on the firm’s choice of strategic variable.   

4.2.4	The Kinked Demand Curve Model
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Figure 4.3:	The Kinked Demand Curve  

	A Kinked demand curve exists for some oligopoly firms that believe rival firms will follow a price decrease but not a price increase.

Figure 4.3 shows the demand curve facing the oligopolist denoted by D1ED1* and has a “kink” at the prevailing sales level of Q0 units. Note that the demand curve D1ED1* is much more elastic above the kink than below, because of the assumption that other oligopolist will not match the price increase but will match the price cut. The corresponding marginal revenue curve is given by D1ABC; BC is the segment corresponding to the ED1* position of the demand curve; D1A corresponds to D1E portion of demand curve. The kink at point E on the demand curve causes the AB discontinuity in the marginal revenue curve. The oligopolist marginal cost curve can rise or fall anywhere within the discontinuous portion of his MR curve (from MC1 to MC2 in the same figure 4.3) without inducing the oligopolist to change his sales level and the prevailing price of OP0.









A cartel is a formal organization of producers within an industry that determines policies for all the firms in the cartel, with a view to increasing the total profits of the cartel. For example, an OPEC cartel is an agreement among oil producing countries. 

	Collusive oligopoly exists when a few producers of a homogeneous product enter into a formal agreement to work out on how they can jointly operate in the market. In a cartel the firms in an oligopoly formally agree on a price to charge and on the market share of each firm. Thus, they behave very much like a monopoly.
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Figure 4.4:	Centralized Cartel Model 

Figure 4.4 shows how a cartel model operates. Note that D is the total demand curve for the homogeneous commodity facing the centralized cartel and MR is the marginal revenue. If factor prices for all firms in the cartel model remain constant, then the cartel marginal cost curve is obtained by summing horizontally the member firms SMC curves and is given by MC curve in figure 4.4. The best level of output for the cartel as a whole is Q* units and is given by point E, where MR=MC. The cartel will set the price of Px. You should note that this is the monopoly solution. If cartel wants to minimize the total cost by producing its best level of output of Q*units, it will then assign a quota of production to each member firm in such a way that the SMC of the last unit produced is the same for all firms. The cartel then decides on how to distribute the total cartel profits in a manner agreeable to the member firms. 

4.3.2	Market Sharing Cartel Model
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Figure 4.5:	Market Sharing Cartel 

Consider a situation in which there are only two firms selling a homogeneous commodity and they have decided to share the market equally as presented in figure 4.5. If DD is the total market demand for the commodity, then “Dd” is the half share curve for each firm and MR is the corresponding marginal revenue. If we further assume for simplicity that each firm has the identical SMC curve shown in the figure, then each duopolist will sell “Q” units (given by point E where the MR =SMC) at the price of “Px”. Thus the two firms together will sell the monopoly output of Q* units at the monopoly price of P*X. However, this solution depends on the assumption of identical SMC curves for the two firms and on agreement to share the market equally.
  
Example: Market Sharing Cartel.
Suppose that the cartel is formed by three firms; each firm with a total function as shown in the table below. If the cartel decides to produce 11 units of output, how should the level of output be distributed among the three firms if they want to minimize cost?

		Total Cost (T.Shs)	









The important thing here is that each firm is required to set its marginal cost equal to that of another firm in the cartel. So, you must first compute the marginal cost schedule for each firm. This is shown in the table below. 

	Firm 1	Firm 2	Firm 3








If firm 1 produces 4 units, firm 2 produces 3 units and firm 3 produces 4 units, the marginal cost at each firm equals T.Shs 3,000. Thus, that choice output for each firm seems to be the optimal distribution of output.

4.3.3	Price Leadership Model
Price leadership is the form of imperfect collusion in which the firms in an oligopolistic industry without formal agreement decides to set the same price as the price leader for the industry. The price leader may be the low cost firm, or more likely the dominant firm in the industry. In the later case, the dominant firm sets the industry price, allows the other firms in the industry to sell all they want to sell at that price, and then the dominant firm comes in to fill the market. 

A formal model of pricing in a market dominated by a dominant firm is presented in figure 4.6. The demand curve DD represents the total demand curve for the industry output. The supply curve SS represents the supply decision of all the remaining firms in the industry, which are assumed to be price takers. 

Using the two curves (i.e.DD and SS), we can derive the demand curve D*D* facing the dominant firm as follows. At a price level of P1 or above, the dominant firm will sell nothing since a group of firms that acts as price takers would be willing to supply all that is demanded. At a price level below P2, the dominant firm will control the entire market since a group of firms that are considered to be price takers will not supply anything. 

Between P2 and P1, the curve D*D* is constructed by subtracting what the group of firms that are considered to be price takers will supply from the total market demand. That is, the leader gets that portion of demand not taken by the group of firms that acts as price takers. 
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Figure 4.6:	Price Leadership  

Now, given the market demand D*D*, the dominant firm can construct its marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC), which will be used to determine the profit maximizing level of output (QD). The equilibrium price of the dominant firm in this particular setting would be PD. Given that price, the group of firms that act as price takers will produce QPT and the total industry output will be QT (=QD+QPT). 

	What are some of the weaknesses of the price leadership model?

Numerical Example: Price leadership model
Suppose that the total market demand for oil is given by QD=-2,000P-70, 000, where Q is the quantity of oil expressed in terms of thousands barrels per year and P is the price of the barrel of oil. Suppose also that there are 1,000 identical small producer of crude oil, each with marginal cost given by MC= +5, where denotes the output of the typical firm.

(a)	Assuming that each small oil producer acts as a price taker. Calculate the firm supply curve , the market supply curve QS and the market equilibrium price and quantity where QD=QS 

(b)	Suppose that an infinite supply of crude oil is discovered somewhere else by the price-leader and that this oil can be produced at a constant average and marginal cost of AC=MC=T.Shs 15 per barrel. Assume also that the supply behavior of group of firms that act as price takers described in part (a) is not changed by this discovery. Calculate the demand curve facing the price leader.

(c)	Assume that the price leader’s marginal revenue curve is given by: MR=. How much should the price leader produce in order to maximize profits? What is the new level of price and quantity that prevail in the market?
Solution








Then, equating the market demand and market supply yield the market equilibrium price and quantity as follows:

-2,000P+70,000 = 1,000P-5, 000
	       P=25,Q=20,000

(b)	Note that the leader has constant marginal cost/average cost of T.Shs 15. Demand for leader is given as:



























	 1.	Oligopoly is defined as market structure characterized by a small 	number of firms and great deal of interdependence, which may be 	actual or perceived by firms. 2.	Since an oligopoly contains a small number of firms, any change 	in the firm’s price or output influences the sales and profits of 	competitors. Moreover, since there are only few firms, each firm 	must recognize that changes in its own policies are likely to elicit 	changes in the policies of competitors as well. The special case of 	a market dominated by two firms is called duopoly.  3.	Oligopolistic industries can be classified in various ways. If the 	firms produce a homogeneous product, the 	industry is called 	pure oligopoly.  If the firms produce 	differentiated products, the 	industry is called differentiated oligopoly. 4.	Pure oligopoly can further be sub-divided into non-collusive and 	collusive. Non-collusive oligopoly exists when oligopolists 	operate individually. Models of non-collusive oligopolies 	presented in this lecture are: Cournot, Betrand and Kinked 	demand curve.5.	The Cournot model makes naïve assumptions concerning the 	ability (or inability) of firm to learn from other firm. Somewhat 	more 	realistic is  Sweezy (Kinked demand curve).   6.	On the other hand, Collusive oligopoly occurs when a few 	producers of a homogeneous product enter into a formal 	agreement to work out on how they can jointly operate in the 	market. The agreement is meant to reduce the degree of 	uncertainties that each producer would face if they made 	individual output and price decisions independently. 7.	Once the rules governing operation of collusive oligopolies in the 	market have been made, each producer has to abide by the rules 	and failures to do so would result in expulsion from the 	agreement. Examples are of collusive oligopolies are cartel, 	market sharing cartel and price leadership.  8.	Price leadership is the form of imperfect collusion in which the 	firms in an oligopolistic industry without formal agreement 	decides to set the same price as the price leader for the industry. 

EXERCISES





























The interdependence of firms in oligopolistic industries that you have learned in the previous lecture has led to the application of game theory in the analysis of oligopolistic behavior. Game theory was developed by mathematician John Von Neumann in 1937 and later on, extended by an economist Oskar Morgenstern in the 1940s. In this lecture we will briefly study how the game theory can be used to study economic behavior in oligopolistic market. 
Objectives of the lecture





5.1	What is meant by Game theory?
Game theory deals with the general analysis of strategic interaction in economic behavior or political negotiation. This theory analyses and explains the way in which, two or more participants, who interact in a structure such as market, can choose courses of action or strategies that jointly affect each participant. Thus, we can use game theory to analyze conflicts of interest among rival firms in oligopolistic industry that we have learned in lecture four. 

5.2	Zero sum games and Non zero sum games
A zero sum game is a game in which whatever is won by one player is lost by the other. This is not the normal outcome of economic games, as in most economic interactions both parties can become better off and so there is some positive net gain to be shared out. 

Many games studied by game theorists (including the famous prisoner's dilemma) are non-zero-sum games, because some outcomes have net results greater or less than zero. In non-zero-sum games, a gain by one player does not necessarily correspond with a loss by another.
	Zero-sum describes a situation in which a participant's gain (or loss) is exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) of the other participant(s). It is so named because when you add up the total gains of the participants and subtract the total losses then they will sum to zero
5.3	Cooperative and Uncooperative games
In a non-cooperative game the players do not formally communicate in an effort to coordinate their actions. They are aware of one another’s existence, but act independently. The primary difference between a cooperative and a non-cooperative game is that a binding contract, i.e., an agreement between the parties to which both parties must adhere, is possible in the former, but not in the latter. An example of a cooperative game would be a formal cartel agreement, such as OPEC, or a joint venture. An example of a non-cooperative game would be a race in research and development to obtain a patent. In this lecture we will be concerned primarily with non-cooperative games.
5.4	Basic Elements of Games

All games that we are going to consider in this lecture have got three basic elements. These are:  (1) players, (2) strategies and, (3) payoffs. 
5.4.1	Players
Each decision-maker in a game is called a player. The players may be individual or firms. All players are characterized as having the ability to choose among a set of possible actions. Usually the number of players is fixed throughout the play. The number of players can be two, three, four, etc. However, to simplify matters in this lecture, we will study the game that involves only two players. 
 
5.4.2	Strategies




These are the possible outcomes of each strategy or combination of strategies for a player, given the rivals counter strategies. Payoffs are usually measured in levels of utility obtained by the players, although frequently monetary payoffs are used instead. In general, it is assumed that players can rank the payoffs of a game from most preferred to the least preferred and will seek the highest ranked payoffs attainable. 

5.5	Equilibrium   

In our study of the theory of markets in the previous lectures, we have seen that equilibrium in the market occurs at the point of intersection between price and marginal cost for the case of perfect competition, or at the point of intersection between marginal revenue and marginal cost for the case of imperfect markets. The natural question that arises is whether there are similar equilibrium concepts in game theory models. For the purpose of this course unit, we are going to consider two types of equilibria that are studied in the game theory. These are: dominant and Nash equilibria. The Nash equilibrium is the same as Cournot equilibrium studied in lecture four.  

5.5.1	 Dominant Equilibrium 
The dominant equilibrium exists when all players in a game have a dominant strategy.  Dominant strategy occurs when one player has a best strategy no matter what strategy the other player follows.  When both players have dominant strategies, the outcome is stable because neither party has an incentive to change. Let us describe how the dominant equilibrium occurs.

Suppose that two firms (A and B) in a duopolistic market which sell competing products have decided to undertake rigorous advertising campaigns. However, the decision by each firm to undertake advertising campaign will be affected by its rival decisions. The payoff matrix in table 5.1 illustrates the possible outcomes of the game.








Before interpreting the above and subsequent payoff matrices, it is worth first to familiarize ourselves with the correct interpretation of each cell in the payoff matrix. The first entry in each cell belongs to firm A and the second entry belongs to firm B. You can observe from the above payoff matrix that if both firms decide to advertise, firm A will make a profit of 1000 and firm B will make a profit of 500. If firm A advertises and firm B doesn’t advertise, then firm A will earn 1500 and firm B will earn zero profit. If firm A doesn’t advertise and firm B advertises, then firm A will earn 600 payoff and firm B will earn 800 payoff. If both firms decide not advertise, firm A will earn 1000 payoff and firm B will earn 200 payoff.  
	What do you think is the right strategy for each firm in table 5.1?

Let us start with firm A. Clearly, firm A should advertise because no matter what firm B does, firm A does best by advertising. You can also see from the payoff matrix that if firm B advertises, firm A earns a profit of 1000 but only 600 if it doesn’t advertise. Similarly if firm B does not advertise, firm A earns 1500 if it advertises, but only 1000 if it doesn’t advertise. Thus, advertising is a dominant strategy for firm A.

The same analysis is true for firm B. That is, no matter what firm A does, firm B does best by advertising. Therefore, assuming that both firms are rational, we know that the outcome for this game is that both firms will advertise. This outcome is easy to determine because both firms have dominant strategies.  

	A strategy is dominant if one player obtains an optimal (the best) solution no matter what the other player does.

However, not every game has a dominant strategy for each player. To illustrate this point, let us slightly change our advertising example. The payoff matrix in table 5.2 is the same as in table 5.1 except for the bottom right cell which shows that if both firms do not advertise firm A will earn a profit of 2000 and firm B will earn a profit of 200.








In the above situation firm A doesn’t have a dominant strategy. However, the optimal decision of firm A depends on what firm B is doing. If firm B advertise, firm A does best by advertising. If firm B does not advertise, firm A does best by not advertising. Although dominant equilibria are stable, the reality is that in many games, one or both players may find it hard to obtain dominant equilibrium. This takes us to the concept of Nash equilibrium.


5.5.2	The Nash Equilibrium 

Nash Equilibrium is named after John Nash, who argued that competitive behavior might result in a situation in which no firm could improve its pay off, given the other firms strategies. A Nash equilibrium is an outcome where both players correctly believe that they are doing the best they can, given the action of the other player. A game is in equilibrium if neither player has an incentive to change his or her choice, unless there is a change by the other player. The key feature that distinguishes a Nash equilibrium from an equilibrium in dominant strategies is the dependence on the opponent’s behaviour. An equilibrium in dominant strategies results if each player has a best choice, regardless of the other player’s choice. Every dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium but the reverse does not hold. In the advertising game of table 5.2 there is a single Nash Equilibrium. That is, both firms should advertise. 

	A pair of strategies is a Nash Equilibrium if firm A’ choice is optimal given B’s choice, and B’ choice is optimal given A’s choice. 

The Nash equilibrium is a generalization of the Cournot equilibrium presented in the lecture four. In Cournot model, the levels of output are the main choices and each firm chose its output level taking the other firm’s choice fixed. This is precisely the definition of Nash Equilibrium. 
 
	What do you think are the problems associated with Nash Equilibrium?

Unfortunately, Nash equilibrium has certain problems. First, a game may have more than one Nash equilibrium. Consider table 5.3 below.  As shown in the payoff matrix (Table 5.3) two strategies (top left and bottom right) are Nash equilibria. Note that if firm A decides to advertise, then the best strategy for firm B to do is to advertise since the payoff to firm B from advertising is 1000 profit and 0 if it doesn’t advertise. And, if firm B undertakes advertisement campaign then the best thing for firm A is to advertise since it will earn a payoff of 2000 profit rather than 0. Similarly, if firm A doesn’t advertise then the best strategy for firm B is not to advertise since it will earn a payoff of 2000 profit rather 0 if it advertises.









The second problem with the concept of Nash equilibrium is that there are certain games in which there is no Nash equilibrium. Consider for example the case depicted in table 5.4 below. Here the Nash equilibrium does not exist. 












Another problem with the Nash equilibrium is that it does not necessarily lead to Pareto efficient outcome.​[5]​ This can be illustrated by using the popular game in economic theory called prisoner’s dilemma. The origin of prisoner’s dilemma stems from the following game. Two people are arrested for a crime. However, the court magistrate has little evidence in the case and is anxious to extract more information. Thus, the magistrate separates the criminals so that they cannot see each other and tells each criminal, “if you confess that you committed the crime and your companion doesn’t confess, I promise you a 6 months sentence, whereas on the basis of your confession your companion will get 10 years.  If you both confess, you will each get a 3 years sentence”. Each suspect also know that if neither of them confesses, the lack of evidence will cause them to be tried for a lesser crime for which each suspect will receive a 2 years sentence. 





	Doesn’t confess	10years, 6months	2years, 2years

The payoff matrix in table 5.5 summarizes the above discussion between the magistrate and prisoners. If prisoner B decides to deny the charges that he committed the crime, prisoner A would be better off confessing because he would get a 6 month sentence. Similarly, if prisoner B decides to confess, then prisoner A is better off confessing since he will get 3 years sentence rather than 10 years. Thus, whatever prisoner B does, prisoner A is better off confessing. 

Of course, the same decision applies for prisoner B. That is, whatever decision taken by prisoner A, prisoner B is better off confessing. In fact, if both prisoners decide to confess, they will reach not only at Nash equilibrium but also at dominant strategy since each prisoner has the same optimal choice independent of the other. 

But, if both prisoners decide not to confess, they would be better off! The strategy (don’t confess, don’t confess) is Pareto efficient. There is no other strategy that makes both prisoners better off. Thus, the strategy (confess, confess) is Pareto inefficient. The problem is that there is no way for the two prisoners to coordinate their actions. If each could trust the other, then they could both be made better off. 

	Prisoner dilemma: A game in which the optimal outcome for the players is not Pareto efficient. 

The prisoner dilemma has a number of important applications in economics. The good example is the problem of cheating in a cartel.  Let us suppose that we interpret “confess” as producing more than a quota in a cartel agreement by firm A. Moreover, let us further suppose that “not confess” implies as sticking to the original quota allocated to a firm A in a cartel.  If firm A thinks that firm B will stick to its quota, it will pay for firm A to produce more than allocated quota. If firm A thinks that firm B will overproduce, then it pays for firm A to overproduce!

5.7	Repeated games
In the previous sections, we have described a game in which firms play only once in the market. Since this is not practical in the real world, prisoner’s dilemma was inevitable. Each prisoner (or firm) could not trust her companion. However, this outcome can change dramatically if we relax this assumption; that is, if repeated games are permitted. In particular, in repeated games, if one firm chooses to defect, on one round, then the rational strategy for the other firm to choose is to defect on the next round.  In doing so, one firm is punishing the other firm for behaving irrationally. Generally speaking, in a repeated game, each firm has got the opportunity to establish a reputation for covert cooperation, and thereby encourage the other firm to follow suits. Having said that, we are now going to consider two cases of repeated games: (i) finite repeated games; (ii) infinite repeated games. 

5.7.1	Finite repeated games.
	What is a “finite repeated game”?

The finite repeated games are games which are played in a fixed number of times. Simply put, the finite game is a game that has fixed rules and boundaries, that is played for the purpose of winning and thereby ending the game. Typically, finite players try as much as possible to control the game, predict everything that will happen, and set the outcome in advance. As an example, consider the game that is played ten times. Two firms, just like what we have learned in the previous sections are involved in this game. 

	To repeat the question, suppose that two firms start playing a finite repeated game that involves 10 rounds. What do you think is going to happen in the last round? That is, round 10?

Since round 10 is the last time the game will be played, each firm will choose the dominant strategy equilibrium and defect. The reason behind is that, playing the game in the last round is just like playing it once, so this outcome is hardly surprising. Once again, consider the situation in round 9! Since in round 10 each firm is going to defect, there is no reason why each firm is going to cooperate in round 9. Since each firm does not believe that the other firm is going to co-operate in round 10, it is totally unreasonable to cooperate in round 9. If one firm cooperates in round 9, the other firm might not choose to cooperate in round 10. 

Once more, consider the situation in round 8! If the other firm is going to defect in round 9, why would the other firm choose to cooperate in round 8? In practice, firms would wish to cooperate on the hope that this cooperation will enhance further cooperation in the future. If it is not possible to enforce cooperation on the last round, then there is no reason to cooperate on the next to the last round, and so on. In brevity, in finite repeated games, the prisoner’s dilemma is an inevitable outcome. 

5.7.2	Infinite Repeated Games.
	What is an “infinite repeated game”?


An infinite repeated game is a game that is played with no boundaries or rules. When the game is played in an indefinite number of times, each firm can influence the behavior of her opponent. As long as both firms care enough about future payoffs, the threat of non-cooperation in the future are sufficient enough to convince firms to play the Pareto efficient strategy. Within the context of an infinite repeated game, the right move to choose is a tit-for-tat strategy. 

	What is a tit-for-tat strategy?

The tit- for- tat strategy could simply be defined as: “equivalent retaliation”. The tit- for- tat strategy is a highly effective strategy in game theory for the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A firm using this strategy will initially cooperate, and then respond in kind to an opponent's previous action. If the opponent previously was cooperative, the firm is cooperative. If the opponent previously was not cooperative, the firm would not cooperate. This strategy depends on four conditions that have allowed it to become the most prevalent strategy for the prisoner's dilemma:
(i)	Unless provoked, the firm will always cooperate
(ii)	If provoked, the firm will retaliate
(iii)	The firm is quick to forgive
(iv)	The firm must have a good chance of competing against the opponent more than once. 

5.8	Sequential games: First mover advantage (Stackelberg Model)













The payoff matrix reported in table 5.6 gives the outcome of a sequential game. On the first side of this game, firm A has two choices to make; either to advertise or not to advertise. On the other side, Firm B, has to observe firm A’s choice and choose either to advertise or not advertise. It can easily been seen on Table 5.6 that this game has got two equilibria commonly known as Nash equlibria—Top left cell and bottom right cell. Nonetheless, one of these two equilbria is not feasible for the reasons that we will shortly explain. Actually, the payoff matrix reported in Table 5.6 conceals the fact that firm B must know in advance what firm A has chosen before making the choice.  

Suppose that firm A has made its choice and is going to advertise. In this context, it doesn’t matter what firm B does and the payoff is (1000, 9000). On the other hand, if firm A doesn’t want to advertise, then the sensible move for firm B to pursue is to choose the strategy of not advertising since the payoff is (2000,1000). Once again, consider firm A’s initial choice. If firm A decides to advertise, the outcome will be (1000, 9000) and thus firm A will get a payoff of 1000. But if firm A doesn’t want to advertise, it will earn the payoff of 2000. Therefore, the rational move for firm A to pursue is not to advertise. In doing so, the equilibrium outcome in this game will be bottom right in which case the payoff to firm A is 2000, and the payoff to firm B is 1000.

The strategies (top, left) are not reasonable equilibrium in this sequential game. That is, they are not an equilibrium given the order in which the players (i.e, firms) make their choices. Of course, it is true that if firm A chooses to advertise, firm B would also wish to advertise. However, it would be silly for firm A to advertise since the payoff is lower than if she chooses not to advertise. In this game, it is very disappointing and indeed unfortunate that firm B ends up with 1000 rather than 9000! 

	Assume that you have been hired as an economic advisor to firm B. Given this conundrum, what would you advice firm B?

The advice to firm B would be to threat firm A. This threat could be in the form of launching advertising campaign if firm A doesn’t want to advertise. If firm A thinks that firm B will proceed with this threat, then the sensible strategy available to firm A is to advertise. The logic is simple. If firm A doesn’t want to advertise while firm B chooses to advertise, they will both end up with zero payoffs. This outcome is shown in the bottom left cell. 

The question that remains to firms A is that: is this threat of advertising from firm B credible or not credible?  It is important to note that firm B’s problem is that once firm A has pursued its choice, firm A expect firm B to behave rationally. Much more importantly is that firm B would be better off if she could commit herself to advertise if firm A doesn’t want to advertise. One way for firm B to make such a commitment is to allow someone else to make her choices. For example firm B might hire a lawyer and instruct him to advertise if firm A doesn’t want to advertise. If firm A is aware of these instructions, the equilibrium outcome can dramatically change. That is, if firm A knows about firm B’s instructions to her lawyer, then firm A knows for sure that it will end up loosing all the revenue. So the sensible course of action for her to pursue is to advertise. In this way, firm B improves her payoff by limiting her choices. 

5.9	A Game of Entry Deterrence
In oligopolistic market, the number of firms in the industry is fixed. In reality, however, entry is possible. Of course, it is in the interest of the firms in the industry to deter such entry. Since firms in the oligopolistic markets are already in the industry, they will use every strategy available at their disposal to make sure that their opponents are kept out of the market. 
 
To put this game of entry deterrence into the right perspective, consider a monopoly that faces a threat of entry by another firm. The entrant has two choices: either to enter or not to enter into the market. In trying to prevent that entry, the incumbent can either reduce the price or keep it constant. If the entrant doesn’t want to enter into the market, its payoff is 1000, and the incumbent’s payoff is 9000. On the other hand, if the entrant decides to enter into the market, then the payoff depends on whether the incumbent decides to fight or not. If the incumbent fights then both players end up with 0 payoff. If the incumbent does not fight, the entrants get 2000 and the incumbent get 1000

The above game is exactly the structure of the sequential game we have studied ealier in table 5.6. The incumbent is firm B, while the potential entrant is firm A. The top strategy is stay out and the bottom is enter. The left strategy is fight and the right strategy is do not fight. As we have seen in this game, the equilibrium outcome is for the potential entrant to enter and the incumbent not to fight. 










Nevertheless, the problem with incumbent is that she can not pre commit herself to fighting if the other firm enters. In so far as the potential entrant recognizes this, she will correctly view any threat to fight as empty. But suppose that the incumbent purchases some extra production capacity that will allow her to produce more output at the prevailing marginal cost. Of course, if she remains a monopolist she won’t actually use this capacity since she is already producing the profit maximizing monopoly output. 

But, if firm A enters the market, the incumbent will now be able to produce so much output to the extent that favor her to compete much more successfully against the new entrant. By investing in the extra capacity, firm B will lower her cost of fighting if the firm A tries to enter the market. Let us assume that if she purchases the extra capacity and if she chooses to fight, she will make a profit of 2000. The pay off matrix reported in table 5.8 illustrates a modified game of entry deterrence once the extra capacity has been added to firm B (i.e., the incumbent) 

Table 5.8: A Modified Game of Entry Deterrence 

	Firm B (Incumbent)




Now, because of increased capacity, the threat of fighting is credible. If the potential entrant comes into the market, the incumbent will get a payoff of 2000 if she fights and 1000 if she does not fight. Thus, the incumbent will rationally choose to fight. The entrant will therefore get a payoff of 0 if she enters, and 1000 if she stays out. The sensible strategy for the potential entrant to do is to stay out. 

This scenario implies that the incumbent will remain a monopolist and never have to use her extra capacity. Despite of this, it is worthwhile for the monopolist to invest in the extra capacity in order to make credible threat of fighting if a new firm tries to enter the market. By investing in excess capacity, the monopolist has signaled to potential entrant that she will be able to successfully defend her market. 

SUMMARY 































Our analysis in the previous lectures has so far concentrated on the product market. But firms that operate in the product market must purchase/hire inputs in order to produce commodities that would in turn be supplied to the market. Thus, we need to study equilibrium conditions under the inputs markets. In this lecture we are going to study markets for the factors of production (i.e. inputs) in a perfectly competitive environment. 

The plan of this lecture goes as follows. We first review the profit maximizing conditions for a firm that utilizes two inputs (e.g. labour and capital). Secondly, we link the profit maximizing conditions to the firm’s demand for inputs. In this way, we would be able to derive both the firm’s demand curve and an industry demand curve for an input. Thirdly, we are going to show how the supply curve of an input is derived. Our major aim here is to bring together demand and supply for inputs and show how the equilibrium price and quantity of inputs are determined in a perfect market.  

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture, you should be able to:Describe the condition for profit maximizing firm in the input marketDerive the firm’s demand curve for inputs when there is only one input, which is required in the productionDerive the firm’s demand curve for inputs when there is more than one input, which is  required in the production(iv)	Explain what is meant by the value of marginal product and 	show how it is linked to the firm’s demand curve for input 	when only one input is allowed to vary (v)	Derive the firms supply curve and explain why the supply 	curve for labour is sometimes backward bending. (vi)	Describe the market equilibrium for the factors of production 	in a perfectly competitive environment. 


6.1	Profit Maximization and Optimal Combination of inputs
The least cost input combination of a firm that uses capital and labour is given by the following equilibrium condition:

                                                 					(6.1)





The wage rate is the addition to the total cost (TC) of the firm arising from employing one additional unit of labour, while the marginal product of labour is the change in total output (Q) arising from change in one additional unit of labour. Analogously, for the case of capital the following must hold true:
            
 			(6.3)

In lecture one we saw that the best level of output under perfect competition occurs at the point where the marginal cost equals marginal revenue or price. Hence, the profit-maximizing firm in the perfect competition must satisfy the following condition:

				(6.4)
By cross multiplication and re-arranging the terms in (equation 6.4) we get the following equations:

MPL.MR=w or MPL.P=w					(6.5)
MPK.MR=r or MPK.P=r 					(6.6)


Thus, the profit maximizing firm rule is that the firm should hire or purchase inputs up to the point where the marginal product of that input times the firm marginal revenue or price of the commodity equals to the price of that input. 

6.2	The Demand Curve of a Firm for one Variable Input
The demand for a factor of production (input) is a derived demand. By derived demand, we mean that it depends on, and is derived from the firm’s level of output and the cost of input. For example, demand for sugar in a bakery factory is a derived demand because it depends on the number of breads a bakery anticipates to sell in the market.

A profit-maximizing firm will hire inputs as long as the income from the sale of an additional unit of output produced by the input is larger than the additional cost of hiring that input. The additional income is given by the marginal product of the input times the marginal revenue of the firm. And since the firm is operating in a perfect competition in the product market, the marginal revenue of that firm is always equal to the price of the commodity. The additional income earned by the firm is called the Value of Marginal Product (VMP) and is equal to the marginal product of the input times the marginal revenue of the firm, or simply the product price. That is, 
 
VMP=MP x MR or VMP= MP x P					      	(6.7)
For example, if the variable input is labour, then 

VMPL=MPL x MR or VMPL= MPL x P

If the variable input is capital, then 	

VMPK=MPK x MR or VMPK= MPK x P

Where:	 	VMP is the value of marginal product
		MP is marginal product
		MR is marginal revenue
		P is price
		K is capital and L is labour

The actual derivation of a firm’s demand for labour when capital and other inputs are held fixed is shown in table 6.1. Suppose that the wage rate is T.Shs 20 and the price of the commodity X is T.Shs10. How many units of labour should the firm employs?





In the above table, column 1 gives the units of labour hired by the firm. Column 2 gives the quantities of commodity X produced. Column 3 refers to the change in total output resulted from change in the one unit of labour used. The marginal product of labour in column 3 is declining because of the law of diminishing return. Column 4 gives the price at which the firm sell commodity X ; Px, which remain constant because of the perfect competition in the product market. Column 5 is obtained by multiplying each value of column 3 by the value of column 4. The VMPL declines because the MPL declines. Column 6 gives the price at which the firm purchases labour factor, PL that remain constant because of perfect competition in factor market. 
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Figure 6.1	Value of Marginal Product (VMP) Curve 

6.3	Demand curve of a Firm for Several Variable Inputs 
When there is more than one variable factor of production the VMP curve of an input is no longer a representative of the firm’s demand curve. The reason is that factors of production (inputs) are used simultaneously in the production of goods so that a change in the price of one factor leads to changes in the employment of other factors. 

Suppose that the firm uses two factors of production, capital and labour (K and L) which are complementary to each other. Assume that the price of labour (w) is initially set at w1 and the amount of labour hired is L1 as shown in figure 6.2. If we do not allow capital to vary, VMPL1 would be the demand curve for labour. 

	Suppose that the price of labour falls to w2 as shown in figure 6.2. What will happen to the amount of labour demanded by the firm?

Since the value of marginal product of labour (VMPL1) exceeds its new price (w2), by the distance W, the firm will tend to expand the usage of labour up to L2*. This is the standard result that we would expect when labour is the only input used in the production process.
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Figure 6.2:	A firm’s Labour demand with capital. 

Although the graphical analysis in figure 6.2 talks about labour, it is much easier to overturn such an analysis into the case of capital input. All what you need to do is to change the names of the variables. In doing so, you should be able to derive the demand for capital in exactly the same way as we have derived the firm’s demand curve for labour DD in figure 6.2.
 
Numerical Example
Assume that the VMPL of a firm is T.Shs 40/= when L=4 and T.Shs 20/=when L=7 and in the long run, when all of the firm’s factors are variable, a fall in PL from T.Shs 40/= to 20/= per unit, with all the other factor prices remaining constant, causes this firm VMPL to shift every where to the right by three units. 

(a)	Derive geometrically this firm’s demand for Labour (DL)
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The VMPL curve is drawn on the assumption that the quantity of all factors of production other than Labour is fixed. It thus represents the firm’s short run demand for labour. In this problem, we are told that in the long run when all factors are variable and their prices rather than the price of labour (wage) are constant, a fall in wage from T.Shs 40 per unit causes the firm’s VMPL to shift to the right to VMPL*. Thus, point A and point C are two points on the firm’s long run demand for labour ( DL). The movement from point B to point C is the internal effect of the change in wage rate. 


(b)	Starting from the profit maximizing point A, a fall in wage rate from T.Shs 40 per unit causes the VMPL to exceed the new and lower PL. Thus, the firm in its attempt to maximize its profits with respect to labour, expands the uses of labour (a movement down its unchanged VMPL curve). However, as the firm uses more units of labour, the MP and thus VMP of factor complementary to labour, shifts up and to the right. Thus, the new and higher VMP for these complementary factors exceeds their unchanged prices. So, this profit-maximizing firm expands its use of these complementary factors, but this causes its MPL and thus VMPL to shift up and to the right. 

6.4	The Market Demand for an Input     
The market demand curve for an input is derived from the individual firm’s demand curve for the input. While the process is similar to the derivation of the market demand curve for a commodity, the market demand curve for an input is not the horizontal summation of the individual firms demand curves. The reason is that when the price of an input falls, all firms will employ more of the complementary inputs as explained in the previous section. This in turn would lead to an increase in the supply of the output in the market. In other words, the supply of the commodity will shift downward and to the right (i.e. increase) leading to a fall in the price of the commodity.​[7]​ 
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Figure 6.3:	Market Demand for input 

Figure 6.3(a) shows the firm’s demand curves for input denoted by D1. The formal derivation of D1 is shown in figure 6.2.  Assume that initially the price of input is given as P1 and I1 is the initial units of inputs as shown in figure 6.3(a). If we take the horizontal summation of the all units of inputs by all firms in the industry, we would obtain the total demand for the inputs at the price P1. This is shown by point D on figure 6.3(b). When the price of input falls to P2, ceteris peribus, the firm would move along its demand D1 curve from point A to point B in order to employ more units of inputs denoted by I3. 

However, when the price of input falls (for example labour), firms will tend to demand more labour and capital. As more labour and capital are pulled into production process, this would lead to an increased supply of the commodity in the market, which would in turn result into a fall in the price of the commodity. Once again, we assume that students are well familiar with graphical analysis of shifts in demand and supply curves for a commodity.  The fall in commodity price will cause a leftward shift in demand curve for labour, from D1 to D2 in the left panel (figure 6.3(b)). So, when the price of input (labour in this particular case) falls to P2, the firm would be on the new equilibrium at point C on the new demand curve D2. Summing horizontally over all firms we obtain point E on the market demand curve shown in right panel of figure 6.3(b). 

6.5	Supply of an Input     
The supply curve of an input is usually positively sloped. That is, at higher level of price of input, ceteris peribus, more inputs will be supplied per unit of time. However, there is an exception to supply curve by an individual labour, which at some higher level of wage tend to exhibit the backward bending shape. The reason why the supply curve for an individual labour tends to display such as shape at higher levels of wage rate is based on income and substitution effects of an increase in the wage rate.   

In particular, the supply of labour by an individual can be derived by indifference curve approach. The indifference curves studied in this lecture represent the preferences of the individual between leisure and income. The horizontal axis of figure 6.4 measures the number of hours available for leisure and the horizontal axis measure the money income or simply wage. The maximum number of hours that the individual is prepared to spend on leisure is 24 hours. 
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Figure 6.4:	The Income and Substitution Effects of a Wage Increase

The wage rate measures the price that an individual attach to the leisure time. As the wage rate increases, the price of leisure also increases. Assume that initially the wage rate is T.Shs 100 per hour and the budget line is given by PQ. Note that point P gives the maximum wage income (i.e.2400) that an individual would earn if he/she puts in work for 24 hours. However, the individual is maximizing the utility by choosing point , thus enjoying 16 hours of leisure (with 8 hours of work, which is obtained by subtracting 16 hours from 24 hours of leisure). Since the wage is T.Shs 100 per hour, an individual is earning 800 shillings (i.e. 8hrs x 100)  

When the wage rate rises to let say T.Shs 200 per hour, the budget line pivots from QP to QR. Under normal circumstances, we would expect an individual to reduce the hours of leisure in order to earn more money. That is, the substitution effects shows that increase in wage would encourage an individual to work 12 hours (point C).

However, the income effect works in the opposite direction. That is, the income effects overwhelm the substitution effects and reduces the hours of works from 8 (point A) to 5 (point B). An income effect occurs because the higher wage rate increases the workers’ purchasing power. The effect of an increase in purchasing power implies that worker can buy more of many of goods, one of which is leisure. Thus, when the income effect outweighs the substitution effects, the result is the backward bending supply curve, shown in figure 6.5.    
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Figure 6.5:	Backward Bending Supply Curve  

Figure 6.5 illustrates the backward bending supply curve as derived in figure 6.4. When the wage rate was T.Shs 100 per hour, individual was working for 8 hours (i.e. 24 hours of leisure minus 16 hours of leisure). This was denoted by point A in figure 6.4. However, when the wage rate rose to T.Shs 200 per hour, individual substituted more leisure hours for working hours.  Note that curve joined by the two points (S and A) in figure 6.5 is the usual supply curve for labour that we would expect. That is, the higher is the wage rate the higher is the number of hours devoted to work. However, when wage increases to 200 individual works less hours. This is denoted by movement from point A to B. 

6.6	The Market Supply for an Input
The market supply curve of an input is obtained from the horizontal summation of supply curve individual suppliers of input. In the case of natural resources or capital, and other intermediate goods which are supplied by the firm, the short run supply curve of the input is generally positively sloped indicating that a greater quantity of input would be supplied per unit of time at higher input price. The market supply curve for labour is usually positively sloped but it may bend backward at higher wage as shown in the previous section. 

6.7	Equilibrium Price and Employment of an Input 
The equilibrium price and employment of an input is determined at the intersection of the market demand and market supply curve of an input. This is shown as P* and I* in figure 6.6. Note that P* is the equilibrium price of input and I* is the equilibrium level of input. 
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Figure 6.6:	Equilibrium Factor Price  

SUMMARY 
	1.	The profit maximizing firm rule is that the firm should hire or 	purchase inputs up to the point where the marginal product of that 	input times the marginal revenue or price of the commodity 	equals to the price of that input. 2.	The first step in analyzing the demand for an input (say labour) in 	a perfectly competitive economy is to consider the demand curve 	of an individual firm. 3.	If there is only one variable input, the firm’s demand curve is the 	same as the value of marginal product schedule. If there is more 	than one variable input, the value of marginal product schedule is 	not identical with the demand curve.4.	The market demand curve for an input can be derived from the 	demand curves of the individual firms in the market. However, it 	cannot be derived by simply taking their horizontal summation.5.	The supply of labour by an individual can be derived by 	indifference curve approach using the concepts of substitution and 	income effects. The substitution effect shows that the increase in 	wage rate would encourage individual to work longer hours. 	However, the income effect works in the opposite direction in the 	sense that higher wage rate increases the workers’ purchasing 	power. The effect of an increase in purchasing power implies that 	worker can buy more of many of goods, one of which is leisure. 	Thus, when the income effect outweighs the substitution effects, 	the result is the backward bending supply curve.    6.	The market supply curve of an input is obtained from the 	horizontal summation of supply curve individual suppliers of 	input. In the case of natural resources or capital, and other 	intermediate goods which are supplied by the firm, the short run 	supply curve of the input is generally positively sloped indicating 	that a greater quantity of input would be supplied per unit of time 	at higher input price. The market supply curve for labour is 	usually positively sloped but it may bend backward at higher 	wage as shown in the previous section. 7.	The market demand and supply curves for an input, the price 	of an input is determined at the their intersection (i.e where 	demand equals supply)
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This lecture continues with our discussion on market for inputs. However, we are going to relax the assumption of perfect competition that we studied in the previous lecture. This lecture is divided into three major parts. In the first part of this lecture, we shall consider the case of the firm, which has monopolistic power in the product market, while the input market is competitive. We will then examine the case of a firm, which has monopolistic power in the product market and monopsonistic power in the input market. The final part of this lecture introduces the market for a fixed input (i.e, land), which will involve the concepts of economic rent and quasi rent. 

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture, you should be able to; (i)	Outline the condition for profit maximization under the input 	market under in imperfect competition (ii)	Explain why the firm demand for a single variable factor 	when the product market is monopolized is not the value of 	marginal product (VMP) but the Marginal Revenue Product 	(MRP)(iii)	Explain why the firm demand for input when there is more 	than one variable is not the MRP curve.Describe the equilibria of the Monopolistic and Monopsonistic firmsCompare and contrast between monopolistic and Monopsonistic exploitations(vi)	Distinguish between economic rent and quasi rent.

The presentation of this lecture will mimic the presentation of the previous lecture (i.e. lecture six). That is, we begin the lecture with an overview of profit maximization and optimal conditions for employment of inputs under imperfect competition in the product market. This will be followed by the derivation of a firm’s demand curve for an input and the market as a whole. Just like what we did in the previous lecture, our major aim here is to show how the interaction of the forces of demand and supply for inputs determines the price and employment of inputs under different imperfect market conditions. 

7.1	 Profit Maximization and Optimal Combination of Inputs
In the previous lecture, we saw that in order to maximize profit, a firm must use the least-cost input combination given by the following condition:
                     					(7.1)





Thus, the profit maximizing rule is that the firm should hire/purchase input up to the point where the marginal product of input (i.e., labour and capital) times the firm’s marginal revenue from the sale of the commodity equal the price of that input.  

Part I:	MONOPOLISTIC POWER IN THE PRODUCT MARKET

7.2	The demand curve of a firm for a Single Variable Input




If the variable input is labour, we have

MRPL=MPL.MR




(i)	MRP is the marginal revenue product
(ii)	MP is the marginal product
(iii)	MR is the marginal revenue 
(iv)	       K is capital and L is labour

Once again, we may illustrate the derivation of the marginal revenue product of labour curve, using numerical examples of the previous lecture, with the difference that the price of the commodity produced declines as output increases. The relevant data are shown in table 7.1.




The first three columns of table 7.1 are the same as those of the previous lecture (see table 6.1). Column 4 gives the declining prices at which the monopolist can sell increasing quantities of commodity X. The TRx (Total Revenue for commodity X) values of column 5 are obtained by multiplying Qx by Px. The MRPL values of column 6 are then obtained from the difference between successive TRx values of column 5. 

The MRPL of column 6 falls because both MPL and the MRx fall. MRPL measures the change in the monopolist’s total revenue in selling the output of commodity X that results from the employment of one additional unit of labour. Algebraically, it is shown as:
   				
Note that TR in equation denotes change in total revenue; L is change in the number of units of labour input. Note also that;

Where, MPL denotes Marginal Product of labour, Q is the change in output and L is the change in units of labour. We also know that; 

Where, MR is the marginal revenue, TR is the change in total revenue and Q is the change in output. It is easy to show that, 
           			 

Columns 6 and 1 of table 7.1 represent the demand schedule of labour for the monopolist seller of the commodity X, when labour is the only variable factor.  The PL of  T.Shs 21 in column 7 remain constant because we are assuming here that the monopolist is a perfectly  competitive buyer of labour inputs. In order to maximize profits, this firm will hire more units of labour as long as the MRPL > PL and up to the point where the MRPL = PL. Thus, this firm will hire five units of labour. 

	With monopoly (or imperfect competition) in the product market, MRx<Px and so MRPL=MPL x MRx<MPL x Px =VMPL. 
Numerical example:
Suppose a monopolist faces a demand curve for output of the form P=100-2Q. The production function takes the simple form of Q=2L, and the labor costs T.Shs 4 per unit. 
(a)	How much of the factor of production (labor) will the monopolist employ?
(b)	How much of the factor of would the competitive industry employ if all the firms in the industry had the same production function?
Solution

(a)	We know that the profit maximizing rule is that the monopolist will employ 	input up to the point where the marginal product of labour times the firm’s 	marginal revenue from the sale of the commodity equal the price of the labour. 	That is, 
	                             	MPL.MR=W
Where; MP is the marginal product of labour, MR is the marginal revenue and 	W is the wage. We can express the total revenue as a function of output as 	follows:

R (Q)	 =PQ= (100-2Q) Q
	We can also express the total revenue as a function of input by substituting 	Q=2L into the above total revenue function as follow:

R (L)	= (100-4L) 2L
	=200L-8L2
	The marginal revenue product is thus expressed as:
				200-16L
	Setting the marginal revenue product equal to the price of input gives us the 	following:
				200-16L=4
	Solving for L should gives us L*=12.25





Remember that VMP is nothing but MP.P=PL. MP is obtained from the production function Q=2L, which is equal to 2.

So, P*=
	How much output will be demanded at this price (i.e.P*=2)?
We plug P=2 into the demand function to get the equation:2=100-2Q, which implies that Q*=49. Since the production function is Q=2L, we can solve for L* as:


So, L*=24.5 or simply 25 is the number of labour that the competitive industry would employ if all the firms had the same production function. 


7.3	Demand of a Variable Inputs by a Monopolistic Firm 

When more than one variable input is used in the production process, the demand for a variable input is not its marginal revenue product curve, but is formed from the points on shifting the MRP curves. The analysis is similar to that of the previous lecture (i.e., see lecture six). Although the graphical analysis depicted in figure 7.1 uses labour input, such an analysis can be extended to the case of other inputs. Specifically, assume that the market price of labour is w1 and that its marginal revenue product is given by MRP1 (see figure 7.1). The monopolist firm is in equilibrium at point A, employing L1 units of labour. If the wage rate falls to w2, the firm would move along its MRP1 curve, to point A*, ceteris peribus. 
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Figure 7.1:	A firms’s Demand for Labour with capital 





7.4 	The Market Demand and Supply of Inputs

The market equilibrium for an input is the summation of demand curves of the individual monopolistic firms. In aggregating these curves, however, we must take into account their shift as the price of input falls: as all monopolistic firms expand their output, the market price falls. The individual demand curves and marginal revenue curves for the commodity produced shift to the left.
 
Graphically, the derivation of the market demand curve for labour is exactly the same as that in figure 6.3(b) (lecture six). However, you should note that the individual demand curves are based on the marginal revenue product of the factor (and not on the value of the marginal product as in the case of perfectly competitive product market, where Px is given for all firms). The market supply is not affected by the fact that the firms have monopolistic power. Thus, the market supply of input (for example labour) is the summation of the supply curves of individuals as derived earlier in lecture six.

7.5	Market Equilibrium
The market price of the input is determined by the intersection of the market demand and market supply for that particular input. Note that the market supply as shown in figure 7.2 is perfectly elastic because the input market is perfectly competitive. Note also that the market demand is based on the MRP and not on the VMP. This means that when the firm has monopolistic power the input is paid its MRP, which is smaller than the VMP. This is called monopolistic exploitation as shown in figure 7.2.
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Figure 7.2:	Monopolistic Exploitation

What we are essentially saying here is that the price of input under monopolistic firm (P) is less than the price of input that would be paid by perfect competitor firm (i.e., P*) at the same units of labour (i.e. L2). Remember under perfect market for inputs, the price of input is equal to the value of marginal product. Note also that the units of inputs employed at the P under monopolistic firm is less than units of inputs that would be employed by perfect competitor firm at the same P offered by monopolistic firm. That is, at P the monopolist firm would employ I2, which is less than I3 that would be employed by the perfect competitor firm. 

Numerical Example
The following table shows the data for the monopolistic seller of commodity X, when labour is his only factor.
Table 7.2:	Monopolist Demand for Labour 




(a)	Marginal Product of labour
(b)	Total Revenue of good X
(c)	Marginal Revenue of good X
(d)	Value of Marginal Product for labour
(e)	Marginal Revenue Product of labour
(f)	How many units of labour should this firm use in order to maximize total profits?













Note that if the good X had been sold in the perfectly competitive market, MRX=PX and the VMPL=MRPL. Since the monopolist must lower the price of good X in order to sell more of good X, then it follows that MRX<PX and the marginal revenue must decline. Thus, the MRPL values are less than the corresponding values of the VMPL. The MRPL schedule falls both because the MPPL falls and because the MRX falls (since we have imperfect competition in the market for commodity X).

(f)	This firm is in equilibrium (i.e., it maximizes its profits with respect to labour) 	when (MPL)(MRX)=MRPL=PL. Thus, this firm should hire four units of factor

(g)	Monopolistic exploitation in this case is T.Shs 4.00/= given by the difference 	between T.Shs 12.80/= and T.Shs 8.80. (12.80-8.80=4.00). This answer is found 	by subtracting the MRPL from VMPL when the firm is in equilibrium. 

Part II:	MONOPSONY 	         

In the previous sections, we have been assuming that there is a perfect competition in the factor market. Now we relax this assumption. In particular, we shift our attention to the case of Monopsony.

	What is Monopsony? How does it arise?

Monopsony refers to the form of market organization where there is a single buyer of a particular factor of production. An example of Monopsony is given by the “mining town” where the mining company is the sole employer of labour in town. 

There are three characteristics that enhance monopsony power. First, if market supply is very inelastic, then the buyer will enjoy more monopsony power. When supply is very elastic, marginal expenditure and average expenditure do not differ by much, so price will be closer to the competitive price. Second, the fewer the number of buyers, the greater the monopsony power. Third, if buyers are able to collude and/or they do not compete very aggressively with each other then each will enjoy more monopsony power. 
In addition, monopsony arises when a factor of production is specialized and is much more productive to a particular firm than to any other firm or use. Because of the greater factor mobility, this firm can pay higher price for the factor and so becomes a Monopsonist. Monopsony also results from lack of geographical and occupational mobility of factors of production. 
 7.6	The demand curve of firm for one variable input 
As singled out previously, a firm using only one variable input maximizes profits by hiring more units of inputs up to the point where the additional revenue from the sale of the commodity is equal to the additional cost of hiring input. This is a general condition and applies regardless of whether the firm is a perfect or imperfect competitor. 

7.7	Supply Curve 
The monopsonistic firm usually faces a positively sloped market supply curve for an input. This implies that in order to hire more units of input, the monopsonist must pay higher price per unit of input. The price of inputs multiplied by quantity of inputs gives the total expenditure by the firm on the inputs. However, since the monopsonist’s total expenditure on inputs increases as it hires/purchases more and more inputs, the relevant issue for the Monopsonist is the marginal expenditure of hiring/purchasing an additional unit of the variable input.​[8]​  

The marginal expenditure is the change in the total expenditure arising from hiring/purchasing an additional unit of the input. For a firm competing with many firms for inputs, the marginal expenditure is equal to the average expenditure (price). For a monopsonist, the marginal expenditure curve lies above the average expenditure curve because the decision to buy an extra unit raises the price that must be paid for all units, including the last unit. 
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Figure 7.3:	Marginal Expense

Table 7.3 illustrates the calculation of the marginal expenditure for labor.  It is clear from table 7.3 that since the price per unit of input rises as employment increases, the marginal expenditure (ME) of the input is greater than its price at all levels of employment.  
Table 7.3:	Total and Marginal Expenses for Labour 
Units of labour	Price of labour	Total expenditure on labour	Marginal expenditure on labour 
12345678910	45678910111213	410182840547088108130	-6810121416182022

The ME curve has a positive slope and lies above and to the left of the supply of the input curve. This implies that the slope of ME curve is greater than the slope of the supply curve, assuming a linear relation. 

7.8	Equilibrium of a monopsonistic firm with single variable input 
The firm that uses a single variable input is in equilibrium at the point of intersection between the marginal expenditure and the marginal revenue product (MRP). This is shown by point E in the figure 7.4. To the left of point E, a unit of input (e.g., labour) adds more to the revenue than to the cost of input: hence it pays the firm to hire additional unit of input. 
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Figure 7.4:	Equilibrium of Monopsonistic Firm

To the right of point E, an additional unit of the input costs more than the revenue it brings to the firm: hence the profit is decreased. It follows that, the profit is maximized by employing that quantity of input I* in figure 7.5 for which the ME is equal to the marginal revenue of the input.  The price of input that the firm will pay for the I* unit of input is P*.

Example
The employment of labour at the mining town of “Mererani” by mining companies is a good example of monopsony. Suppose that demand for labour is given as:
		W=30,000-125L
Where, W is the wage (annual wage), and L is the number of labour hired. The supply of labour is given by:
		W=1,000+75L

(a)	Find the number of labour and amount of wage that the monopsony would hire and pay respectively
(b)	If the monopsony faced an infinite supply of labour at the annual wage level of T.Shs 10,000, how many labour would it hire?
Solution
(a)	The supply curve is equivalent to the average expenditure curve. With a supply curve of W=1,000+75L, the total expenditure is WL= 1,000L+75L2.  Taking the derivative of the total expenditure function with respect to the number of labour, the marginal expenditure is 1,000+150L. the monopsonist would equate demand with marginal expenditure to determine the number of labour to hire. That is; 
30,000-125L=1,000+150L
L=105.5
	Substituting L=105.5 into the supply curve to determine the wage:
		1,000+(75)(105.5)=T.Shs 8,909	





7.9	Equilibrium of the Monopsonist who uses Several Variable Inputs





The names and definition of variables in equations (7.5) and (7.6) remain as expressed in the previous sections. When we divide both sides of equations (7.5) and (7.6) by MPL and MPK respectively and combining the results we obtain the following:

 								(7.7)




7.10	Monopolistic and Monopsonistic Exploitation: A Comparison 

We now use figure 7.5 to make a comparison between monopolistic and monopsonistic exploitation. Note that figure 7.5 is drawn by combining together figures 7.2 and 7.4. So, it is crucially important to understand the analyses of figures 7.2 and 7.4 before jumping to figure 7.5! 
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Figure 7.5:	Monopolist and Monopsonistic Exploitation 

Monopsonistic exploitation on the other hand is shown by the difference of competitive price of input (PC) and Monopsonistic Price of input (PC-PS). Monopsonistic exploitation can be split into two parts. The part (PC -PM) is due to monopoly power of the firm. This part would exist even if the firm were not a Monopsonistic in the input market. Hence, this part is not uniquely attributable to monopsonistic elements. However, the part PMPS is due to the monopsonistic power of the firm in the input market. This power enable the firms to pay a price of input lower than the MRP of an input.    

	(i)	In a perfectly competitive markets the factor is paid its VMP(ii)	If a firm has monopolistic power in the product market but no 	power in the factor market, the factor is paid its MRP<VMP(iii)	If the firm has both monopolistic power in the product market 	and Monopsonistic power in the factor market, the factor is 	paid a price, which is even lower than the MRP. This is  	Monopsonistic exploitation 

Part III: MARKETS FOR FIXED INPUTS




	What is an economic rent?

Economic rent is the difference between the payments made to a factor of production and the minimum amount that must be spent to obtain the use of that factor. When the supply curve is perfectly inelastic, all payments to of factor of production are economic rents because the factor will be supplied no matter what price is paid. The supply curve of such factors may be represented by a vertical line, such as SS in figure 7.6

It is important to note that the price of fixed inputs is determined by the conditions of demand only, since its supply is a constant quantity. For example, assume the land suitable for growing tomatoes is OS in figure 7.6. If the demand for tomatoes gives rise to the demand curve D1 for the tomatoes-growing land, then the price of land per unit is P1. Assume that the demand for tomatoes increases; this shift the demand for the particular land to D2, which pushes the price of land to P2. This change in the rent of land is solely due to the forces of demand. Under these conditions, rent is not a cost of entering in the determination of the price of tomatoes, but is the effect of the price of tomatoes, which, in turn leads to shift in the demand for the land. 
	The return to a factor whose supply is completely fixed is often referred to as a pure economic rent.
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Figure 7.6:	economic Rent 
The concept of economic rent can be extended beyond land input. Figure 7.7 illustrates the concept of economic rent as applied to the case of labour input. When the market supply curve for an input is positively sloped (i.e., figure 7.7), rent is represented by the area above the supply curve and below the equilibrium price of an input (the shaded area in figure 7.7). 
  
Wage
                     











                         B


                            0                           L*                                  Labour





	What is main difference between an economic rent and quasi rent?

In the short run, some factors are fixed, while in the long run they become variable. The payment to an input, which is in fixed supply in the short run, is called the quasi rent, because it disappears in the long run, unlike rents, which persist in the long run. 

In the short run fixed inputs cannot be withdrawn from their present use and transferred to another where payments are higher. Thus, firms pay the variable inputs their opportunity cost (otherwise these factors would move elsewhere), while the fixed inputs receive what is left over; quasi rents are a residual payment. To understand this, we describe the short run equilibrium of a firm in a perfectly competitive market as shown in figure 7.7. The firm maximizes its profit, producing OQ units of output, from which it receives total revenue (TR) equals to the area OPEQ. The firm pays OQBA=TVC (total variable cost) to the variable factor. It cannot pay less and keep them in its employment. The fixed factors earn the residual ABEP, which is the quasi rent. Thus;
				Quasi rent	=	TR-TVC
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Figure 7.8:	Quasi Rent 











	1.	MRPL measures the change in the monopolist’s total revenue in 	selling the output of commodity X resulting from 	employment 	of one additional unit of labour. 2.	When more than one variable factor is used in the production 	process, the demand for a variable factor is not its marginal 	revenue product curve, but is formed from the points on shifting 	the MRP curves. 3.	The derivation of the market demand curve for labour is exactly 	the same as that in lecture six. However, you should note that the 	individual demand curves are based on the marginal revenue 	product of the factor and not on the value of the marginal product. 4.	The market price of the factor is determined by the intersection of 	the market demand and market supply. However, there is an 	important difference. The market demand is based on the 	MRPL 	and not on the VMPL. This 	means that when the firm has 	monopolistic power the factor is paid its MRP, which is 	smaller than the VMP. .5.	Monopsony refers to the form of market organization where there 	is a single buyer of a particular factor of production.	 Monopsony 	power depends on the 	characteristics of the “buying-side” of the 	market. There are three characteristics that enhance 	monopsony 	power: (1) the elasticity of market supply, (2) the number of 	buyers, and (3) how the buyers interact.6.	The Monoposony firm is in equilibrium when it equates the 	marginal expenditure curve on the factor to its MRP. The 	marginal expenditure is the change in the total expenditure on 	the factor arising from hiring an additional unit of the factor7.	When the firm has Monopsonist power in the input market it pays 	to the factor a price, which is less (not only than its VMP, but also 	less) than its MRP. This gives rise to monopsonistic exploitation. 	8. 	The price of a factor, whose supply is fixed in the long run, is 	called rent. The price of a factor, which is in fixed supply only in 	the short run, is called quasi rent. Rent persists in the long run, 	where as quasi rent disappears in the long run as the factor 	become variable.  
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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
8.0	Introduction 

Until this point we have examined the behaviour of individual decision making units and the workings of individual markets for commodities and inputs under various market structure in isolation. Such analyses, however, do not take into account the interconnection between consumers and firms in the economy. Such interconnection is usually studied under the topic of general equilibrium. 

In this lecture, we are going to introduce the topic of general equilibrium and examine the issue of interconnection among the various decision-making units and markets in the economy. This will allow us to trace both the effect of a change in any part of the economic system on every other part of the system, and also the repercussion from the latter to the former. 

We begin the lecture by distinguishing between partial equilibrium analysis and general equilibrium analysis and examining the conditions under which each type of analysis is appropriate. Then, we present the conditions required for the economy to be in the general equilibrium of exchange, production and of production and exchange simultaneously. We also explain why the markets may fail to achieve efficient allocation of resources as implied in the general equilibrium analysis. 

Objectives of the lecture
	By the end of this lecture, you should be able to:Make a distinction between the partial and general equilibrium analysisExplain the term “economic efficiency”State the assumptions of 2x2x2 (i.e. two individuals, two factors of production and two commodities) general equilibrium model	(vi)	Show how equilibria in exchange, production and 				simultaneous exchange and production in a 2x2x2 general 			equilibrium model are achieved.	(v)	Define contract curve and marginal rate of transformation	(vi)	Derive the production possibility frontier from the Edgeworth 		contract curve	(vii)	Explain the sources of markets failures.
  
8.1	Partial Equilibrium and General Equilibrium. 

Partial equilibrium analysis studies the behavior of individual decision making units and the workings of individual markets, viewed in isolation. The previous lectures (i.e., lecture one to seven) have adopted a partial equilibrium approach. In short, the basic characteristic of a partial equilibrium analysis is the determination of the price and quantity in each market by demand and supply curves drawn on the ceteris peribus clause. 

General equilibrium analysis on the other hand, is the study of the behavior of all individual decision making units and all individual markets simultaneously. In practice, a complete general equilibrium analysis, which evaluates the effects of a change in one market on all other market, is not feasible. Instead, what we can do is to confine ourselves to a few markets that are closely related as shown in figure 8.1.

8.2	General Equilibrium in a Comparative Statics Analysis
A very simplified model of general equilibrium analysis using comparative static analysis can be illustrated with a simple economy composed of two sectors: a consumer sector, which includes households consuming chicken, and the business sector (the chicken industry). It is assumed that all breeding of chicken takes place in the business sector (chicken industry) and labour in the chicken industry is supplied by the households. Finally, all the income is spent on the chicken consumption.
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Figure 8.1:	General Equilibrium in comparative statics

	Comparative statics is the comparison of two different equilibrium states, before and after a change in one of the variables. That is, it compares two different equilibrium points, once they have changed. It does not study the motion towards equilibrium, nor the process of the change itself.  
Consider a fall in demand for chicken following an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) associated with illness and death in humans. Panel  shows that both the price and quantity of chicken fall from PC to PC1 and C to C1 respectively. However, the reduction in demand for chicken has a spillover effects on other markets such as chicken feeds and workers working in other firms in the chicken industry. As a matter of facts, there are numerous firms that are involved in the chicken industry (e.g. workers working in the chicken feeds industry, fast food workers, chemicals, etc). However, we confine our analysis to the sellers of chicken feeds and workers employed in the chicken feed firms. Panel B shows that the demand for chicken feeds decline following a fall in demand for chicken (Panel A). The reduction in the chicken feeds again has an impact on the workers working in the chicken feeds industry (panel C). As the number of firms exit from the chicken feed industry, workers are laid off, causing the demand for labour to shift from DL to DL1, and price of labour (nominal wage income) to fall from PL to PL1. The fall in the price of labour (nominal wage income) means that demand for chicken declines further from DC1 to DC2 (panel D). The complete, final effects on the demand for chicken and on the other markets can only be measured through full-fledged general equilibrium framework that uses a set of mathematical equations.

Example
Suppose that the demand curves for chicken and beef in hypothetical economy are given as follows:






Where;  is the quantity supplied for chicken and  denotes the quantity supplied for beef. 

(a)	Find the equilibrium price for chicken and beef
(b)	Find the new equilibrium price of chicken and beef  when the supply curve for chicken becomes 

Solution:
(a)	The general equilibrium in these two markets occurs at prices at which supply equals demand in both markets simultaneously, that is; 
 









When these prices prevail in the chicken and beef markets, supply equals demand in both markets simultaneously. 










	What is economic efficiency?
An allocation of goods and inputs in an economy is economically efficient if there is no any other feasible allocation of goods and inputs that would make some consumers better off without making others worse off. This definition is exactly the meaning of Pareto efficient to be studied in the next lecture. By contrast, an allocation of goods and inputs is economically inefficient if there is an alternative feasible allocation of goods and inputs that would make all consumers better of as compared with the initial allocation. 

8.4	The Attainment of General Equilibrium
In the following subsections, we look at a simple competitive economy composed of two individuals (A and B), two commodities (X and Y) and two factors of production (K and L) and present a graphical treatment of a general equilibrium in exchange only, in production only, and simultaneous equilibrium in exchange and production. Specifically we make the following assumptions.

(a)	There are two factors of production, labour (L) and capital (K), whose quantities are exogenously given. These factors of production are homogeneous and perfectly divisible.

(b)	Only two commodities are produced, X and Y. The production functions of the two commodities are represented by isoquants maps, which are smooth and convex to the origin. 

(c)	There are two consumers in the economy, (i.e., A and B), whose preferences are represented by indifference curves, which are convex to the origin. It is assumed that consumers’ choices are independent such that the consumption pattern of A does not affect B’s utility and vice versa. 

8.4.1	General Equilibrium of Exchange





Where,  is the marginal rate of substitution of commodity X for Y for individual A, and  is the marginal rate of substitution of commodity X for Y for individual B. The above condition comes from the fact that a consumer who is faced with the market price Px and Py, (price of commodities X and Y respectively) would reach equilibrium, by equating the marginal rate of substitution of the two commodities to their price ratios. That is;

    
Since both consumers in perfectly competitive markets are faced with the same prices, the condition for a general equilibrium of both consumers is the one shown in (8.1). We can use the Edgeworth Box of exchange to convey a similar message. This is shown in figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2:	General Equilibrium of Exchange

In particular, figure 8.2 plots the indifference curves of consumer A with the origin being the south west corner and the indifference curves of B with the origin being northeast corner. That is, the utility of individual increases as he moves towards 0B, and the utility of individual B increases as he moves towards 0A. The two individuals reach the general equilibrium of exchange when the slopes of their respective indifference curves are tangent to each other. The equilibrium is denoted by point B, C, and D. The locus of these points is called the Edgeworth contract curve of exchange. All the points that lie along the Edgeworth contract curve of exchange 0A0B represent economic efficiency in exchange. 
8.4.2	General Equilibrium of Production
In our simple general equilibrium model, the firms being profit maximizers in competitive markets will be in the equilibrium when they produce on the Edgeworth contract curve. This follows from the fact that the factor prices facing the producer are the same, and their profit maximization requires that each firm equates its MRTS L, K (Marginal rate of technical substitution) with the ratio of factor prices, w/r. 


Where w and r are the factor prices for labour and capital respectively prevailing in the market and MRTS L, K is the marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital. The above condition comes from what we learned in lecture eight. In brevity, we saw from lecture eight that a firm is in equilibrium if it chooses the factors combination, which minimizes its costs at the point where the slope of the isoquant is equal to the slope of the isocost. Algebraically;

We can also show the equilibrium of the firms by using the Edgeworth box of production. On the axes of this Edgeworth of production, we measure the given quantities of the factors of production, K and L. We also plot isoquants of commodity X with the origin being the southwest corner and the isoquants of Y with the origin being the northeast corner. The locus of points of tangency of X and Y is called the Edgeworth contract curve of production. This curve includes the efficient allocation of K and L between the two commodities. 
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Figure 8.3:	General Equilibrium of Production 

However, not all points of the Edgeworth box represent efficient allocations of the available resources. An allocation of inputs is efficient in the production of commodity X and Y if it is impossible to increase the production of one commodity without decreasing the quantity of the other. Point “A” is a point of inefficient production, since reallocation of K and L between the two commodities such as to reach any point from A to B leads to a greater production of one or both commodities. 

The Edgeworth contract curve of production is very important in deriving the production possibility frontier. This is accomplished by mapping its points on the output space. In particular, from each point of the Edgeworth contract curve of production, we can read off the maximum obtainable quantity of one commodity, given the quantity of the other. For example, point B in a figure 8.3 shows that, when the quantity of X is X1, the maximum quantity of Y that can be produced (with given factor K and L) is Y3. The X1, Y3 combination is represented by point B* in figure 8.4. Similarly, point C of the Edgeworth contract curve of production shows that, given X2, the maximum amount of Y that the economy can produce is Y2. Point B* in figure 8.4 is the mapping of point “B” from the input space into the output space.      
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Figure 8.4:	Production Possibility Curve 

The production possibility curve of an economy is the locus of all Pareto efficient output, given the resource endowment (K and L) and the state of technology. This curve shows the maximum quantity of a good obtainable, given the quantity of the other good. At any point on the curve, all factors are optimally (efficiently) employed. Any point inside the curve is technically inefficient, implying unemployed resources. Any point above the curve is unattainable, unless additional resources or new technology or both are found. The slope of the production possibility curve is called the Marginal Rate of Transformation, MRT x, y, which shows the amount of Y that, must be sacrificed in order to obtain an additional unit of X. That is,

Since the production possibility frontier measures the opportunity cost of producing one commodity over the other, it can be shown that the ratio of the marginal cost of the two products must be equal to the ratio of their marginal cost. That is;


The slope of the production possibility curve is also equal to the ratio of the prices at which X and Y will be supplied by perfectly competitive industry; 

	The production possibility curve is also called product transformation curve because it shows how a commodity is “transformed” into another, by transferring some inputs from the production of one product to another
Example









(a)	Is this allocation of inputs economically efficient? Why or why not? 
(b)	If it is not, identify a reallocation of inputs that would allow both firms to increase their output. 

Solution










Since the MRTS are not equal, the current allocation of inputs is not economically efficient. 

(b)	At the current allocation, firmcan trade 2 units of labour for 1 unit of capital without changing output. By giving up one unit of labour to receive one unit of capital the firm can increase output. At the current allocation, firm B can trade two units of capital for one unit of labour without affecting output. By giving up only one unit of capital in exchange for one unit of labour, firm B can increase its output. Therefore, by re-allocating one unit of capital from firm B to firm  and one unit of labour, from firm to firm B both firm can produce more output.  

8.4.3	General Equilibrium of Exchange and Production
The production possibility frontier denoted by TT in figure 8.5 is the one shown in figure 8.4. Every point on TT is a point of general equilibrium in production. The rectangle 0AYE0BXE shows the Edgeworth Box of exchange. Every point the contract curve 0A0B of exchange is a point of general equilibrium of exchange
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Figure 8.5:	General Equilibrium of Exchange and Production 
The general equilibrium in both production and exchange requires the marginal rate of transformation of commodity X for commodity Y in production (denoted by slope MRTXY in figure 8.5) be equal to the marginal rate of substitution of commodity X for Y for the two individuals denoted by the slope of MRSXY in the same figure 8.5.  


8.5	Perfect Competition and Economic Efficiency 

This section shows that subject to the assumptions outlined under section 8.4, a perfect competitive market equilibrium is efficient. Remember that an efficient allocation of resources require the following three conditions to hold:
	(1) 	 
	(2) 
(3) MRTx, y  =  MRSA x, y  = MRS Bx, y
(a)	Consumers maximize utility at a point where their indifference curve is tangent to 	their budget constraint. In a perfect competitive market, all consumers face the 	same prices. Hence in equilibrium, all consumers have the same MRS. Hence 	condition (1) is satisfied in the competitive market economy.

(b)	Firms minimize cost of producing a given level of output where their isoquant curve is tangent to their isocost curve. Since all firms in the industry face the same set of factor prices, the MRTS for the industry will be equal to the ratio of factor prices. And if factor markets are competitive, all firms in all industries will face the same set of factor prices. Hence, condition (2) is satisfied in the competitive markets economy. 





The previous discussion has concluded that perfect competitive economy would generally generate the efficient allocation of resources. However, the next question that naturally arises is whether competitive allocation would also be equitable. Put it differently, does the efficient allocation of resources guarantee equitable distribution of resources? This is a very difficult question to answer for at least two reasons. First, defining “equity” is a daunting task leave alone how to quantify it. Second, the concept of equity might involve the subject comparison of utility. But economists generally disagree on how to make interpersonal comparison of utility.  





	Why markets fail to achieve efficient allocation of resources?





Imperfect competition includes all those situations in which economic actors (that is buyers and sellers) exert some market powers in determining prices. As a result, marginal revenue is different from market price since the firm is no longer a price taker. As we showed in lecture two, a profit maximizing monopoly, does not produce where price is equal to the marginal cost. Because of this behaviour, relative prices will no longer accurately reflect relative marginal cost, and the price system no longer carries the information about costs necessary to ensure efficiency. 

	Imperfect competition refers to the market situation in which buyers or sellers have some influence on the prices of goods or services.

8.7.2	Externalities




Public goods are goods that can be provided to users at zero marginal cost and must be provided on nonexclusive basis to every one such as national defense. Once public goods are produced, it is impossible (or at least very costly) to exclude anyone from using them. In such a case price cannot equal marginal cost (which is zero), since the fixed cost of providing the good would not be covered. 





































The focus of this lecture is concerned with the significance for the economic welfare of the society as whole of the existence of a general equilibrium solution. Among other things, welfare economics studies the conditions under which the solution to the general equilibrium model can be said to be optimal. It examines the conditions for economic efficiency in the production of output and in the exchange of commodities and equity in the distribution of income. The conditions for the optimal allocation of inputs among commodities and exchange of commodities among consumers have been discussed in the previous lecture and will be summarized in section 9.2.  

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture, you should be able to:Define welfare economics and link it with the general equilibrium model studied in the previous lectureExplain the meaning of Pareto optimality (or Pareto efficiency).Define social welfare functionDefine and derive the utility possibilities frontierDefine and derive the grand utility possibilities curveIllustrate and explain the conditions for the maximization of social welfareState the fundamental theorems of welfare economicsExplain what is meant by compensation principle and Scitovsky paradox 

 9.1	Definition of Welfare Economics 

Welfare economics is the branch of economics that focuses on normative issues (Stiglitz, 2000). The most fundamental normative issue in welfare economics is the economy’s organization—what should be produced, how it should be produced and who should make these decisions. According to Broadway and Bruce (1984), welfare economics is the framework within which the normative significance of economic events is evaluated. In order to make statement about the consequences of economic welfare of an event, we must go beyond the study of positive economics, which is concerned with the effect of an event on measurable economic variables such as price and quantity. 

9.2	Pareto Optimality Criterion
One of the most widely used criteria is the so-called Pareto optimality criterion.  According to Pareto optimality criterion, any change that makes at least one individual better off and no one worse off is an improvement in the welfare. Conversely, a change that makes no one better off and at least one worse off is a decrease in welfare. It is called Pareto criterion after the famous Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). 

	In summary, A Pareto optimal state in the economy can be obtained if the following three marginal conditions are fulfilled:The Marginal Rate of Substitution between any two goods be equal for all consumersThe Marginal Rate of Technical Substitution between any two inputs be equal in the production of all commodities	(iii)	The Marginal Rate of Transformation be equal to the MRS for 		any two goods

	What are the weaknesses of Pareto criterion?
This criterion is individualistic in two aspects. First, it is concerned with individual’s welfare, not with the relative well being of different individuals.  For example, a change that made the rich much better off but left the poor unaffected would still be Pareto improvement. Some people, however, think that increasing the gap between rich and the poor is undesirable as it brings social tensions. Second, it is each individual’s perception of his or her own welfare that counts.

A situation may be Pareto optimal without maximizing the social welfare. However, welfare maximization is attained only at a situation that is Pareto optimal. In other words, Pareto optimality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for welfare maximization. All points on the production possibility curve are Pareto optimal. The choice among these alternative Pareto optimal states requires some measure of social welfare.

9.3	The Social Welfare Function



























Figure 9.1:	Social Welfare Contours 

Each social welfare curve is the locus of points that join together alternative combinations of utilities of good A and B, which yield the same level of social welfare. The higher the social welfare function the higher is the level of social welfare. With such a set of social welfare functions, alternative states in the economy can be evaluated. For example, figure 9.1 shows that a change, which would move the society from point B to point C or D, increases the social welfare. A change moving the society from A to B leaves the level of social welfare unchanged. The problem with the social welfare function is that there is no easy way method of constructing it. 

9.4	Maximization of Social Welfare

The maximization of social welfare requires that the slope of social welfare function be tangent to the slope of the grand possibilities utility frontier. We have already established the shape of social welfare function in the previous section. Our major task now is to derive the grand utility possibilities frontier. However, before deriving the grand utility possibility frontier, we need to derive the utility possibility frontier. The reason behind is that grand utility possibilities frontier is derived from the utility possibilities frontier.  

9.4.1	Utility Possibilities Frontier
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Figure 9.2:	Utility Possibilities Frontier

Point A is obtained by transferring A1 and B3, from figure 8.5 onto figure 9.2.  Point B is obtained by transferring A2 and B2 from figure 8.5 onto 9.2.  Point C is obtained by transferring A3 and B1 from figure 8.5 onto 9.2. By joining point A, B and C, we obtain the utility possibilities frontier denoted as UU in figure 9.2.

9.4.2	The Grand Utility possibilities frontier

The grand possibilities utility curve is the envelope of utility possibilities frontiers at Pareto optimum points of production and exchange. It indicates that no reorganization of production-exchange process is possible that could make someone better off, without at the same time making some one worse off. 
	How do we derive the grand utility possibility frontier?

First and foremost, note that the utility possibilities frontier UU in figure 9.2 has been derived from the contract curve of exchange drawn from point 0A to 0B on the production possibility frontier in figure 8.5. If we choose another point on the production possibilities frontier in figure 8.5, such as point 0B*, we can construct another Edgeworth box diagram and get another contract curve of exchange, shown by the curve from point 0A to 0B* in figure 9.3. Then, we can transfer the exchange contract curve into the utility space in order to get another utility possibilities frontier. 
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Figure 9.3:	DERIVATION OF GRAND Utility PossibilitIES Frontier
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Figure 9.4:	Grand Utility Possibilities Frontier

Now, let us carefully transfer the Edgeworth contract curve of exchange from figure 9.3 into figure 9.4. Note that point F is derived by mapping the indifference curves B1* and A2* from figure 9.3 into figure 9.4. Point E is derived by mapping indifference curves A1* and B2* form figure 9.3 into figure 9.4. The utility possibilities frontier U*U* is by joining points F and E from the Edgeworth box of exchange denoted by 0AYE*0B*XE*. Since there are an infinite number of points on the Production Possibility Frontier (PPF), in figure 9.3 there must be an infinite number of utility possibility curves, each such curve for each commodity mix on the production possibility curve


The grand possibilities utility frontier is denoted by the curve GG in the figure 9.4. As said before, it is an envelope of utility possibility frontiers at Pareto optimum points of production and exchange. Note the UU is the utility possibilities curve derived from Edgeworth box of exchange denoted by 0AYE0BXE. Note that point D in figure 9.4 is derived by mapping the indifference curves denoted by A2 and B1; point C is derived by mapping indifference curves denoted by A1 and B2. 

9.4.3	Welfare Maximization 
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Figure 9.5:	Maximization of Social Welfare 

9.5	Fundamental Theorems of welfare economics
There are two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. The first theorem states that every competitive economy is Pareto efficient. The second theorem states that every Pareto efficient resource allocation can be attained through a competitive market mechanism, with appropriate initial redistributions. 
The first theorem appears to make a case for non-intervention: let the markets do the work and the outcome will be desirable. The theorem is often taken to be an analytical confirmation of Adam Smith's "invisible hand" hypothesis, namely that competitive markets tend to bring the efficient allocation of resources. 
The second theorem states that out of all possible efficient outcomes (of which there may be many) one can achieve any particular efficient outcome by enacting lump-sum wealth redistribution and then letting the market take over. This appears to make the case that intervention has a legitimate place in policy. That is, redistributions can allow us to select from among all efficient outcomes for one that has other desired features.
	Fundamental theorem of welfare economicsEvery competitive economy is Pareto efficientEvery Pareto efficient resource allocation can be attained through a competitive market mechanism, with appropriate initial redistributions.
9.6	Measuring Change in Social Welfare
This section examines some very important criteria for measuring changes in the social welfare. The first one is the Pareto criterion already discussed in section 9.2. According to this criterion, a policy increases social welfare if it benefits some members of the society (in their own judgment) without harming others.  
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Figure 9.6:	Measuring change in the social welfare
However, in practice it is almost impossible to make any change without making at least one person worse off. Again, consider the grand utility possibilities GG in figure 9.6.  A movement from point K, inside the grand utility possibility frontier to points such as E, D, and F would benefit one or both consumers without harming anyone. Thus, the movement from K to E, or K to D or, K to F, would pass the Pareto optimality criterion.  However, the movement from point K to C would make individual B better off while individual A is made worse off. Such a movement does not satisfy the Pareto optimality criterion. 

9.6.1	Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Criterion
The Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion was devised to overcome the limitation of the Pareto criterion explained in the previous section.​[10]​ According to compensation’s criterion, a policy change in the society will improve welfare if those who gain from the change can fully compensate the losers and still retain some gains. One can ask the “gainers” how much money they would be prepared to pay in order to have the change, and the “losers” how much money they would be prepared to pay in order to prevent the change. If the amount of money of the “gainers” is greater than the amount of the “losers” the change constitutes an improvement in the social welfare, because the “gainers” could compensate the “losers” and still have some net gain. However, the compensation principle has is its own problems.  
The first problem with compensation criterion is that it is based on monetary valuation of different persons. Thus, it implicitly assumes that the marginal utility of money is the same for all individuals in the society. Assume for example that the economy consists of two individuals, A, who is millionaire, and B, who has an income of T.Shs 4000/=. Suppose that the change being considered by the government will benefit individual A, who is willing to pay T.Shs 2000/= for this change to happen, while it hurts individual B, who is prepared to pay T.Shs 1000/= to prevent the change. According to Kaldor- Hicks criterion the change will increase the social welfare since the net gain to A, after he compensate for B is T.Shs 1000/=. However, the gain of T.Shs 2000/= gives very little additional utility to millionaire A, while the loss of T.Shs 1000/= will decrease a lot to the welfare of B, who has a much greater marginal utility of money than A. Thus, the total welfare will be reduced if the change takes place. 
The second problem is that it is possible for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion to indicate that a given policy increases social welfare but also to indicate that, after the change, a movement back to the original position also increases social welfare.  This limitation is solved by Scitovsky criterion.

9.6.2	Scitovsky criterion









	1.	Write short notes on the following:		(a)	Social welfare function		(b)	Grand utility possibility frontier		(c)	Scitovsky paradox		(d)	Theorems of welfare economics2.	A Pareto optimal allocation is better than any allocation that is not 	Pareto optimal; consequently, a policy that moves us from non-	Pareto 	optimal allocation to a Pareto optimal allocation is 	necessarily making an improvement. Yes or No? Explain. 3*. 	Assume that we have an exchange economy consisting of two 	individuals, 1 and 2 and two commodities; X and Y. Suppose that 	individual 1 indifference curve is given as U1=3Y1, and individual 	2 indifference curve is given as U2=5X2. Assume that the initial 	allocation of X and Y to individual 1 and 2 is X1= 0.5, Y1=0.5, 	X2=0.5, and Y2=0.5. Is the initial allocation Pareto optimal? 	Explain. 4. 	Adam and Butuka are residing in an island. Adam has 1 unit of 	commodity X and Butuka has 1 unit of commodity Y. Their 	preferences between these two items are represented by the 	following two equations.														Where, XA and YA are the consumption of X and Y by Adam. 	Similarly XB and YB are the consumption of X and Y by Butuka. 	Given these two utility functions, the marginal utility of X and Y is 	as shown below. 			, , Is the following allocation Pareto optimal?If Adam and Butuka were to trade between themselves, would they be able to attain this allocation as a competitive equilibrium?What would be the equilibrium price ratio of X to Y?
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In the previous lectures of this course unit, our analyses have largely focused on private goods. It was assumed that the market system is able to provide an optimal allocation of private goods through the interaction of forces of demand and supply. But not all goods or services can be provided by the private sector even if there is a demand for them in the economy. 

In particular, public goods such as the national defense cannot be provided efficiently by the private sector through the normal operations of markets forces of demand and supply because of their idiosyncratic features (i.e. non-exclusivity and non-rival).  This means that we need to analyze the provision of public goods by using different methods because the normal operations of market forces of demand and supply studied in the previous lectures are to a large extent inappropriate.    

In this lecture, we first define the public goods and provide the rationale for government intervention in providing them. In doing so, the lecture is going to illustrate the difference between the demand for private and public goods. As an alternative to market mechanisms in providing public goods, three concepts are introduced. First, lecture introduces the concept of cost benefit analysis—a technique used to evaluate whether the provision of public goods is economically viable or not. Second, we introduce the unanimity rule—Lindahl model. Lastly, we introduce the concept of voting. 

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture, you should be able to:	(i)	Define public goods	(ii)	Contrast public goods from mixed public goods and merit 			goodsIllustrate the difference between demand curves for public goods and private goodsUse Cost Benefit technique to evaluate the provision of public goods. Describe the unanimity rule—Lindahl model.Describe how voting rule is used to allocate resources in provision of public goods.Define majority voting, voting paradox, cycling, double peaked preferences and medium voter theorem.

10.1	Definition of a Public good

A public good is a product or service whose benefits cannot be limited to those who directly pay for it.  This definition of public goods stresses two attributes: non-exclusivity and non-rivalry. 

10.1.1	Non-exclusivity 
The first attribute that characterizes public goods is that they are non-exclusive. By non-exclusive we mean that people cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of the public good. National defence is the standard example. Once an army is set up, every one in a country benefits from its protection whether they pay taxes or not. In other words, once a public good is supplied to individual A, individual B cannot be excluded from consuming it, whether B wants it or not.

10.1.2	Non-rivalry 
The second attribute that characterizes many public goods is that they are non-rival. By non-rival we mean that the benefits can be provided to additional users at zero marginal social cost. That is to say, if a public good is supplied to one individual, it is at the same time made available to the other at zero cost. This is true of national defense and lighthouses. Such goods are indivisible in the sense that the benefit that each user derives from them cannot be measured nor can the actual number of users of such goods be identified.

The government is involved in the provision of public goods because those who receive the benefit from such goods are unwilling or unable to pay the full cost of supplying them. In the case of pure public goods such as the national defense, the only means of financing them is through government taxes or government debt, or through aid. The reason such project usually cannot be financed by the private sector is that their non-excludable and non-rival nature means that people will be able to receive their benefits whether or not they pay for them.  


10.2 	Mixed public good




A merit good is a good or service, which is generally being made widely available to the society because of the social and economic benefits that it provides. Virtually, all societies would consider the provision of primary education for children as socially and economically desirable because of the large contribution it makes towards shaping children’s minds. The purpose of primary education is to ensure that every child acquires the basic knowledge, skills, behaviour and habits to become a good citizen. Thus, in most countries, primary education is provided by the state as a merit good.  


10.4	Differences in Demand for Public and Private goods 

In this section we analyze the difference in demand for public goods and private goods from partial equilibrium analysis. This analysis is important because it tells us that we cannot rely on market mechanism to set the optimal provision of public goods. Instead, some alternative mechanisms should be devised. Some of these alternative mechanisms are described from section 10.5 

10.4.1	Demand for Private goods

The total (market) demand for private good is obtained by summing horizontally the individual demand curves. The reason why we are summing horizontally the individual demand curves for private goods is that consumers of private goods buy different quantities but normally pay the same market price.  

In figure 10.1 we show how to derive the market demand curve for good X in a economy with the two individuals: A and B. The curve DADA depicts A’s demand curve for good X and the curve DBDB depicts B’s demand curve for the same good X. Now, given the market price 0P, demand for good X by individual A is equal to 0QA and individual B’s demand curve for good X is equal to 0QB. The total market demand at 0P is thus given by summing the two individual demand curves as follows: 0QA+0QB=0QM. In brevity, the market demand curve, DMDM is found by adding demand curve for individual A and demand curve for individual B.  
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Figure 10.1:	Market Demand for a Private good

Notice also that the marginal benefits derived by the two people are the same, indicated on the graph by α and β, and that these in turn are equal the market marginal valuation γ. 

10.4.2	Demand for Public goods
The total demand for a public good is obtained by vertical summation of individual demand curves for a public good. This is to be contrasted with private goods, whose total demand is obtained by the horizontal summation of individual demand curves for private goods. This fundamental difference stems from the fact that consumers of a public good consume the total amount of the good, and that the combined price paid by consumers is the sum of prices paid by each consumer.  
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Figure 10.2:	Demand for Public Goods

Figure 10.2 illustrates an economy with two persons, A and B. The demand curves DADA and DBDB represent the two individuals’ demand curves for the public good Y.  The market demand curve is denoted by the line DMDM. Assume that the quantity of public good available is given by 0Q*. Individual A is willing to pay the price 0P1 for this quantity and B is willing to pay 0P2. The marginal benefits derived from the good by the two individuals differ. Thus, the price which the society as whole is prepared to pay for the quantity 0Q* is 0P3=0P1+0P2. If MC represents the social and private marginal cost of producing the public good, then the interaction of the MC and DMDM determines the socially optimal level output of the public good.  


However, the demand curves in figure 10.2 are hard to be revealed voluntarily if consumers believe that the amount they pay will be related to the preferences they reveal. That being the case, consumers will find it worthwhile to be free riders.  In other words, when consumers feel that the total output of the good will not be affected significantly by the action of any single person, they are likely to make no contribution to supporting the good, although they will use whatever output of the good is forthcoming.  
 
	A free rider is somebody who wants to enjoy the benefit of a public good at zero cost. 
Numerical example
Suppose that demand curves for public goods by two consumers are given as follows:
Consumer 1	P1=100-Q
Consumer 2  	P2=200-Q
Assume that the marginal cost of public good is T.Shs 240. Determine the efficient level of level of public good 
Solution
As noted previously, the marginal social benefit curve (i.e. demand curve) with public good is the vertical sum of consumer demand curves. When we sum vertically, we are adding prices (i.e. willingness to pay). Therefore, we need to find P1+P2. To do this, we add the two consumer demand curves in their inverse forms with P on the left hand side and Q on the right hand side as they are given above. That is,  
MSB=P1+P2= (100-Q)+(200-Q)=300-2Q.
To find the efficient level of output, we set MSB=MC. Thus, 300-2Q=240, and Q=30. Therefore, Q=30 is the efficient level of output. 

10.5	Cost Benefit Analysis 
The cost benefit analysis is a technique that is used to calculate and compare the cost and benefit of a project over a long period of time. As a technique, it weighs the total expected costs against the total expected benefits of one or more projects in order to choose the most profitable project. We can use cost-benefit analysis as an alternative technique for resource allocation in the public sector. 

The need for cost benefit analysis arises when private profitability does not rank public projects according to the social ordering. This might be for several reasons. First, the price of inputs and output may not reflect their true marginal cost or benefits if the inputs are purchased or the output are sold in a distorted market. Second, the social value of inputs and output purchased and sold may not capture all the benefits of the project in the presence of externalities arising from the project. Moreover, some of the projects inputs and output may be non-marketed items, which nonetheless have to be evaluated. 

As a technique, cost benefit analysis is widely applied to public expenditure policies (for example in transport, education and health). While carrying out cost benefit analysis for public projects, we are required to identify social costs and benefits and quantify them in the common monetary unit. Social benefits include all those effect of a policy change that increases social welfare, and social cost includes all those costs that reduce social welfare. The project is economically acceptable only if its social benefits are greater than or equal to its social costs. 





The existence of externalities (to be explained in detail in lecture eleven) and monopolistic elements in the market mechanism means that the prevailing market prices do not reflect the true social marginal cost of resources in alternative uses. This leads the cost benefit analysis to resort to using shadow prices, which are imputed prices designed to reflect the true social cost and benefit of the project. What we are saying here is that shadow pricing must be used to attach value to the cost and benefits of the project because the prevailing market prices do not fully capture social benefits (cost), which are important in project evaluation.  

10.5.2	Discounting Process. 
The cost and benefit of the project, once given the monetary values through shadow pricing, must be discounted before in order to determine the worthiness of the project. The reason for doing that is that a transaction, which takes place at different times, cannot be compared directly because of the interest payment that might have been earned (or paid) between the two dates. What we are saying here is that a sum of T.Shs 1,000,000 received today is worth than the same sum received in two years time. This is because you can invest T.Shs 1,000,000 today at say, 10 percent interest rate compounded annually and get T.Shs 1,210,000 at the end of year two. This is exactly equal to saying that the present value of T.Shs 1,210,000 to be received in two years time (given a current rate of interest rate of 10%) is T.Shs 1,000,000. The same discounting process is generally applied to the cost and benefits of the project. 


There are two rules for discounting the cost and benefits associated with a project. These are net discounted present value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return. In the next subsections, we are going to consider each of these two rules. 

10.5.3 		Net Present Value
This refers to the process of discounting back to the present the streams of costs and benefits associated with the project during its lifetime. The project is economically justifiable when the NPV is greater than zero. The NPV can be computed by applying the following formula: 

    (10.1)

Where, B1, B2, BT and C1, C2, CT are the gross benefits and costs accruing in year 1 up to year T. The discounting factor (interest rate) is denoted by 

	Net Present Value (NPV) entails discounting the value of future transactions back to the present day to take account of the effect of potential interest payments

Example 10.1:  Cost Benefit Analysis.
Suppose that the City Council contemplates to construct a tarmac road, whose lifetime lasts for a period two years. The city council economists estimates that the cost associated with tarmac road is T.Shs 10 million and it has no maintenance costs, so that all cost are incurred at the initial stage. Moreover, the city council’s economists estimate the benefit of the road is T.Shs 6 million and T.Shs 7.25 million in year 1 and 2 respectively. The appropriate discount rate is 10%. 
	Is this project economically viable?





Since the NPV is greater than zero (i.e. NPV>0), the project is economically viable. The city council should carry on with the project. 

10.5.4		The Internal Rate of Return
The internal rate of return is defined as the discount rate that equates the net present value of the project to the value of zero. The project is economically viable if the internal rate of return (IRR) exceeds the current market rate of interest rate. The IRR is given by the following formula:





Where  is the discount rate; other variables remain as defined before. Applying the IRR to the above example of a tarmac road project which has present cost of T.Shs 10,000,000 million and benefits of T.Shs 6,000,000 million after year one and T.Shs 7,250,000 after year two, we have:  

       =

       =

      = 10,000,000(1+r)2-6,000,000 (1+r)-7,250,000 = 0

Let x = (1+r)
       =10,000,000x2- 6,000,000x -7,250,000 = 0

We can divide the above by equation by 1,000,000 without losing anything. This yields; 
       = 10x2-6x-7.25=0
We then apply the quadratic formula x= 
  = 

 = 
This implies that x =1.2. However, note that x =1+r. Hence, r = 0.2 or 20%. Thus, the IRR is 20%, which is greater than the rate of interest rate of 10%. So the project proves to be acceptable by the IRR rule. 

10.5.5 	Net Present Value versus Internal Rate of Return
	In the presence of conflicting results between the rules (i.e.NPV and IRR), which one should be relied upon in deciding whether or not a given project is economically justifiable?

A conflict can sometimes arise between the two rules when they are used to compare the viability of project. In cases of conflicting results, the appropriate solution is to apply the NPV. The IRR rule is deemed to be less appropriate because it discriminates against capital-intensive projects, which yields benefits in the more distant future. 

10.6	Pitfalls of the Cost Benefit Analysis
In this section we discuss some problems that may be encountered in the decision making process that emanate from the cost benefit analysis. These are; obtaining accurate estimates of social benefits and costs and determining the appropriate discount rate. 

10.6.1	Estimating Social Benefit and Cost

An accurate estimate of the social benefits and costs associated with a public project is essential with a public project is essential for economic decision-making. These benefits and costs are often both direct and indirect. Direct benefits and costs may be either explicit in (the form of payments) or implicit (in the form of opportunity cost). Indirect benefits and costs are frequently implicit. 

	Direct benefits are benefits obtained by users of the project. Direct costs are the costs directly connected with a project. Indirect benefits and costs are external or third-party benefits and costs. 
For the tarmac road project, direct and implicit benefits would consist primarily of fuel and other car expenses saved by the motor vehicles drivers. Direct and explicit cost would include the payments for construction and maintenance of the road. Indirect and implicit benefits would include a reduction in traffic congestion and an increase in business activities as people find it easier to move from one point to another. Indirect costs would include inconveniences imposed on people during the construction period. The list of benefit and cost as they relate with the tarmac road project outlined here is by no means exhaustive. 

Some of the costs and benefits outlined above are hard to measure, leave alone translating them into monetary values. Because the estimates of the benefits and costs are crucial to the decision making process, it is important to calculate them as accurately as possible. The greatest weight should be given to the benefits that are the most easily quantifiable. 

10.6.2	Social Rate of Discount
There are some disagreement among economists and public officials concerning the appropriate discount rate for projects involving public goods.
 
	The discount rate used for evaluating public goods projects is called the social rate of discount.





In the previous sections, we have seen how the cost benefit analysis can be used to decide on the allocation of resources. In democratic societies, however, various voting procedures are usually used to decide on public expenditures. In this section we look at some of these procedures.

10.7.1	Unanimity Rules: Lindahl Model 
Lindahl’s model is named after Swedish economist Erik Lindahl. Under this model, it is assumed that people would agree to be taxed in exchange for the benefits that they get from using a public good.  Figure 10.3 depicts Lindahl’ s model, in which case it is assumed that there are only two people in the society (e.g. Tabu and Shida). Suppose that Tabu’s share of the cost of a public good is 30 cents. If the market price of public good is P, then  is the price that Tabu would pay in order to consume that public good. 
More generally, let the curve labeled TT (in figure 10.3) shows the Tabu’s demand curve for a public good. Unlike the normal demand curve, which would place the price of public good on the vertical axis, Lindahl’s solution places the share of public good’s cost that Tabu must pay in order to enjoy the benefit of public good. The negative slope of TT indicates that at a higher tax-price for the public good, Tabu will demand a smaller quantity of it. 
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Figure10.3 	Lindahl’s Model

To be noted here is that the tax share of both Tabu and Shida must sum to 1 (i.e. ST+SS=1). When ST goes up, the quantity demanded by Tabu decreases. In figure 10.2, the Shida’s tax share increases as we move down along the vertical axis from 0*. The tax shares are refereed to as Lindahl prices.

You can see from the above model that Lindahl’ equilibrium occurs at a set of Lindahl prices in which both persons vote for the same quantity of the public good. In figure 10.3, this occurs when Tabu’s tax share is 0S* and Shida’s tax share is 0*S*. At these Lindahl prices, both parties agree that Q* output of public good should be produced. 





Unanimity rule described in the previous section is difficult to attain. As a result, majority-voting systems that do not require unanimity may be desirable. Majority voting rule is commonly used in the parliament or any other public institutions in Tanzania to decide on how economic resources should be allocated in  providing public goods. Under the majority-voting rule, each member of the parliament has one vote, so that an issue (such as the construction of tarmac road) that receives more than 50% of the total votes is adopted.

Although the mechanics of majority rule voting are familiar to you, it is useful to review them carefully. Consider a parliament with three voters; Chiyumba, Adam and Salawa who have to make the choice among the proposed expenditures that the government is committed to spend in primary school education. These various level of expenditures are 100 million, 200 million and 300 million. The voters’ preferences are depicted in table 10.3. Each column shows how the voter ranks the choices. For example Salawa prefers higher levels of expenditure (300 million), but given the choice between 100 million and 200 million, he would prefer 200 million. 






     

















Second, consider a voting between 200 and 300 millions. Applying similar logic presented above, 200 would win. Third, consider the voting between 100 and 300. Applying similar logic 300 would win by the same margin. Certainly, this is a confusing result. The first voting suggests that 100 is preferred to 200; the second suggests that 200 is preferred to 300. The third suggests that 300 is preferred to 100. Conventional notion of consistency suggest that 100 should also be preferred to 300. But in the third voting, just the opposite occurs. Although each individual preferences are consistent, the community’s are not. This phenomenon is referred to as Voting Paradox

	Voting Paradox: With Majority Voting, community preferences can be inconsistent even though each individual’ preferences are consistent.   

10.7.4		Cycling
Another related problem is that the paired voting can go on forever without reaching a decision. Consider again table 10.2. After the voting between 100 and 200, 100 wins. If 300 challenges 100, then 300 wins. If 200 then challenges 300, 200 wins. The process can continue indefinitely, a phenomenon called cycling.  

	When a paired majority voting on more than two possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being reached is what we call cycling

	Why does the majority voting rule lead to all these problems?
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Figure 10.4:	Voting Paradox  

A peak in individual’s preferences is defined as a point at which all the neighboring points are lower.​[12]​  We say that a voter has a single peaked preference, if as s/he moves away from the most preferred outcome in any and all directions, her/his utility consistently falls. On the other hand, a voter has a double peaked preference if, as he moves away from the most preferred outcome, utility goes down but then goes up again. Thus, Chiyumba has a single peak at point 100; Adam at point 200; but Salawa has two peaks, one at point 100 and the other at point 300. It turns out that Salawa’s preferences are the ones that lead to the voting paradox. If Salawa had any set of single peaked preferences, majority voting would lead to a consistent decision. This is why no voting paradox emerges in table 10.2. 

	If all Voters’ preferences are single peaked, voting paradox does not occur. 

10.7.5	Median Voter Theorem 

Median voter is defined as a voter whose preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters’ preferences. Median voter theorem states that as long as all the preferences are single peaked; the outcome of majority voting reflects the preferences of the median voter. 

As an illustration of the median voter theorem, assume that there are five voters: Semeni, Siyawezi, Sikitu, Sikujua, and Sijali. Each of these voters proposes the amount of money that every one should contribute in order to celebrate Sikitu’s birthday. As can be seen from table 10.3, each voter has a single-peaked preference. Since preferences are single peaked, the closer an expenditure level is to a given voter’s peak, the more he or she prefers it.





Note that a movement from zero contribution to T.Shs 50,000 will be preferred by all voters. Moreover, any contribution from T.Shs 50,000 to 100,000 will be approved by Siyawezi, Sikitu, Sikujua and Sijali. However, a movement beyond T.Shs 150,000 will be blocked by Semeni, Siyawezi and Sikitu. Hence, the majority will vote for T.Shs 150,000 (i.e. Sikitu, Sikujua and Sijali). Consequently, Sikitu is a median voter. 

















	1.	A public good is a product or service whose benefits cannot be 	limited to those who directly pay for it.  Public goods have got 	two major characteristics. These are; non- rival and non- 	excludable. 2.	The market demand for public goods is obtained by summing the 	individual demand curves vertically, not horizontally as in the 	case of private goods. 3.	The social benefit of a public or mixed public good is the sum of 	the private benefits, if any, plus the external, or third party, 	benefits of the good. 4.	The social cost of a pure or mixed public good includes the costs, 	if any, recorded by the private sector plus additional external cost 	of the resources used up, borne by the general public. 5.	The Cost Benefit Analysis is usually applied to the decision 	making process for the production of goods by the public 	sector. In this type of analysis the costs and benefits of a project 	are calculated and compared. The project is economically 	acceptable only if its benefits are greater than or equal to its costs. 6.	Net Present Value (NPV) entails discounting the value of 	future 	transactions back to the present day to take account of the	effect 	of potential interest payments. 7.	Majority voting rule is commonly used in the parliament or any 	other public institutions in Tanzania to decide on how economic 	resources should be allocated in pursuit of providing public 	goods. 	Under the majority-voting rule, each member of the 	parliament 	has one vote, so that an issue (such as the 	construction of tarmac road) that receives more than 50% 	of the 	total votes is adopted8. 	Voting Paradox arises from the fact that community preferences 	can be inconsistent even though each individual’ preferences are 	consistent. When a paired majority voting on more than two 	possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being 	reached is what we call cycling. Median voter theorem states that 	as long as all the preferences are single peaked; the outcome of 	majority voting reflects the preferences of the median voter. 
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So far, our analysis on the various theories of market structure in the previous lectures has assumed away the existence of externalities in the economy. While assuming away the existence of externalities, we were able to establish both the equilibrium price and quantity prevailing in different markets. However, the existence of externalities in the economy typically creates divergence between private cost (benefit) and social cost (benefit). As a result, the condition that marginal cost is equal to price/marginal revenue is no longer valid. And since externalities are not reflected in the market prices (as this lecture will shortly illustrate), the observed market prices provide misleading information for the optimal allocation of resources. 

Objectives of the lecture
	After reading this lecture you should be able to:Define the term “externality”Outline the causes of externalities(iii)	Differentiate between private cost and social cost; private 	benefit and social benefits(iv)	Illustrate the effects of externalities on production efficiency(v)	Show the effects of externalities on consumption efficiency	(vi)	Outline and explain the solutions that may be used to 			internalize externalities 

11.1	Definition of an Externality 
An externality is an effect of one economic agent’s activities on another’s well being that is not taken into account by the normal operations of the price system. Externalities can be classified as either being positive or negative; depending on whether individuals/firms enjoy extra benefits they did not pay for or suffer extra cost they did not incur. Positive externalities generally include things like public goods and research. Negative externalities on the other hand include things like air pollution. In general, goods and services that generate positive externalities will tend to be under supplied in the market. On the other hand, goods and services that generate negative externalities in the society such as air pollution will tend to be oversupplied.






(i)	Interaction between the economic system and the environments.
One of the reasons for the existence of externalities is that every economic activity begins and ends within the environment. That is, economic agents use resources such raw materials from the environment and transform these resources into goods, which are then returned into the environment as waste once those goods have been used. Such waste products create external cost to the society.

(ii)	Incomplete property rights
A property right establishes the right to own a property as being "ones own thing" in relation to other individuals or groups. A property right  assures the owner the right to dispense with the property in a manner the owner of the property deemed it right within legal and societal bounds. Since human societies have less developed property and communal property rights over the resources like air, space and water (i.e., river, ocean, lakes) both positive and negative externalities can arise. 

(iii)	High transaction costs
Transaction costs are the costs that parties/individuals incur in the process of making an exchange or bargain. When you buy a music system from a store, your costs will be not only the price of music system itself, but also the energy and efforts it requires to find out the best music systems you prefer, where to get it and at what price, the cost of traveling from your house to the shopping centre, etc. These costs go beyond the cost of the music system and they may be too high to facilitate transactions/exchange. According to North and Thomas (1973), transaction costs are made up of three types:​[13]​ 
	Search and information costs: these are the costs such as those incurred in determining that the required good is available on the market, the price of the good, quality, etc 
	Negotiation costs/bargaining cost: these are the cost required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transactions, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on.  
	Enforcement costs: these are the costs of making sure that the other party/individual sticks to the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action through the legal system if this turns out not to be the case. 





An externality between firms occurs when the activity of one firm affects the wellbeing of another firm outside the market system. Consider the two firms; one producing chemicals, which dumps its toxic chemicals into the river and the soft drink industry which uses water from the polluted river to produce soft drinks. In this particular example, the firm that produces chemicals creates external cost to the firm that uses water to produce soft drinks (i.e., the cost of purifying water). 
11.1.2	Externalities between Firms and People
An externality between firm and people occurs when the activities of the firm impact directly on individual’s wellbeing.  The activity of a cement plant that pollutes atmosphere imposes costs on people living near the plant in the form of ill health and increased dust. But, people may also exert external costs on firms’ activities. For example, the riot by university students in a shopping centre may affect the sales of the shopkeepers. 

11.1.3	Externalities between people 




In the following subsections, we are going to describe the divergence between the private and social costs in production. We assume that firms are operating in a perfectly competitive environment. This assumption implies that a particular firm is in equilibrium when marginal cost is equal to price. That is, 

				MC=P
However, the marginal cost of a typical firm does not include the external cost it creates to the society. When we add the external cost that a firm creates to the society we obtain the marginal social cost (MSC). In other words, marginal social cost is the sum of private marginal costs (MC) and the marginal external cost.  That is, 

			MSC=MC + Marginal External cost 
The divergence between marginal cost and marginal social cost implies that the production of a particular commodity does not take into account social optimal level of production. As a result, the society may experience either external cost or external benefit depending on the type of the commodity under production. 

11.2.1	External Cost in Production
The existence of external cost in production makes the firm’s marginal cost to be less than the social marginal cost. As explained before, since the firm’s marginal cost is less than marginal social cost, the allocation of resources to the production of output (e.g., chemicals) is not socially optimal because the firm does not pay the full cost the producing chemicals as shown in figure 11.1. In particular, note that the marginal social cost in figure 11.1 lies above the private marginal cost. The vertical difference between these two curves is the marginal external costs incurred in the production of chemicals. 
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Figure 11.1:	External COST IN production
An externality in figure 11.1 arises because at social optimal level of chemical production (i.e., at Q*) the private marginal cost is less than the social marginal cost. As a result, there is over production of chemical. In other words, the firm’s output is greater than the social optimal level of output (i.e., Q>Q*) 

11.2.2	External Benefits in Production
The existence of external benefits in production makes the firm’s marginal cost of production to be greater than the marginal social cost. Since MC>MSC the production of output (i.e., chemical in our example) create external benefits to the society as shown in figure 11.2.
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Figure 11.2:	EXTERNAL BENEFITS in production   

11.3	Externalities in Consumption
Just like what we have done in the case of production externalities, we now illustrate the effect of externalities on consumption. We are going to examine the effect of divergence between private marginal benefits (MB) and Marginal social benefits (MSB) of consuming a particular good. The marginal benefit is the additional benefit received when one more unit of a good is consumed. Marginal social benefits (MSB) is the sum of private marginal benefits (MB) and marginal external benefits. The marginal benefit tends to fall as a consumption of good increases. This is reflected in a downward sloping MB curve from left to the right. 

11.3.1	External Cost in Consumption
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Figure 11.3:	EXTERNAL costs in consumption   

11.3.1	External Benefits in Consumption
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Figure 11.4:	EXTERNAL benefits in consumption   
In short, when marginal social benefits are greater than the private marginal benefits, the consumption of a good/service by an individual (i.e., Q) will be less than the socially optimal level of consumption (i.e., Q*)

11.4	Solutions to Internalize Externalities
The existence of externalities in the economy means that there must be some mechanisms to internalize them in order to promote economic efficiency/optimal allocation of resources from a society’s vintage point. A number of solutions have been suggested to mitigate both positive and negative externalities as explained in the following sub-sections. 

11.4.1	Merger
One way to deal with an externality is to internalize it by combining the involved parties. For simplicity, assume that there is only one polluter as in the case of chemical and soft drinks industries. If the chemical Industry would take into account the damages it imposes on the soft drink industry, then a net gain would be possible. In other words, if the chemical industry and the soft drink industry coordinated their activities, then the profit of their joint enterprise would be higher than individual profits when they don’t coordinate. For instance, if the chemical industry purchased the soft drink industry, it would willingly produce less output than before, because at the margin doing so would increase the profits of his soft drink subsidiary more than it decreased profits form its factory subsidiary. Indeed, an outsider observer would not even characterize the situation as an “externality” because all decisions would be made within a single firm. 

11.4.2	Social conventions  
One approach that can be used to mitigate negative externalities is through social conventions.  The argument here is that "certain social conventions can be viewed as attempts to force people to take into account the externalities that they generate. Whilst this is an interesting suggestion it perhaps raises more questions than it answers. Will an individual be held to social conventions when there is a substantial cost in doing so? And how does one apply a solution designed for dealing with individuals to enforce social conventions on large multi-national corporations? Thus, the useful of social conversion may be limited to low cost externalities generated by individuals.

11.4.3	Pigouvian Tax 
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Figure 11.4:	Pigouvian Tax     

Note that the MC and MSC represent the private and marginal social cost of production of commodity Q respectively. The market price of commodity Q is given by P*. An excise tax of amount “t” would reduce the net price received by the firm to P*-t, and at that price the firm would choose to produce Q*. The tax causes the firm to reduce its output to the social optimal amount. At Q* the chemical industry incurs private marginal cost of P*-t and imposes external costs on soft drink industry of t per unit. The per unit tax is therefore exactly equal to the extra costs that the chemical industry imposes on soft drink industry.  The Pigovian tax is shown by the shaded area.
Example: Pigovian tax
A cement plant is accused by residents in the neighborhood for polluting the air. The government has recently received this complaint and wants to fix the problem.  Assume that the inverse demand function for the cement  (which is also the marginal benefit curve) is 
Pd=24-Q
Where Q is the quantity of cements in millions tons per year and Pd is the price consumer pay (in Tanzanian shillings per ton) for buying cements. The inverse supply curve (also the marginal private cost) is given as:
MPC=2+Q
Where MPC is the marginal private cost when the industry produces Q. The cement industry emits one unit of pollutant for each ton of cements it produces that goes into the air. As long as there are fewer than 2 million units of pollutant emitted each year the external cost is zero. But when the pollutant exceeds 2 million units, the marginal external cost is positive. The marginal external cost curve is
			     
MEC = 
   	    
Where MEC is the marginal external cost in Tanzanian shillings per unit of pollutant when Q units of pollutant are released. 
(a)	What are the equilibrium price and quantity for cements when an externality is not yet mitigated? 
(b)	Find the quantity of cements that would be supplied by the market at the socially optimal level
(c)	Suppose that the government wants to impose a pigovian tax of one shilling per unit of pollution. Calculate the pigovian tax that would make the cement industry to produce the economically efficient quantity of the cement

Solution
(a)	The equilibrium is found by setting marginal benefit (24-Q) equal to the marginal private cost (2+Q). The equilibrium quantity is thus, Q=11 million tons of cements (and therefore 11 million units of pollutants) per year. The equilibrium price is found by substituting Q=11 into either the marginal benefit or the marginal private cost equation. In equilibrium, consumer pays a price of T.Shs 13 per ton. 
(b)	The socially optimal level of production would be determined by the intersection of marginal social cost and demand (marginal benefits) curves. The equation representing the marginal benefit curve is Pd=24-Q. The marginal social cost curve is the sum of marginal private cost (MPC=2+Q) and marginal external cost curve (MEC= -2+Q when Q>2). When Q>2, the marginal social cost is therefore MSC=(2+Q)+(-2+Q), which simplifies to MSC=2Q. When we set the marginal benefit equal to marginal cost, we find that 24-Q=2Q, or that Q=8. Thus, the economically efficient quantity of cement production is 8 million tons per year.
(c)	The efficient pigovian tax is 6 shillings per ton. 

11.4.4		Subsidies 
The government can subsidize positive externalities that many private firms would be unwilling to supply. By paying the subsidies equal to the shaded area, production is encouraged to expand from Q to the optimal level Q*. 
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Figure 11.5:	subsidies     
Subsidies thus offer a solution to the problem of underproduction of goods. However, subsidies can be criticized on the ground that the payments of subsidies require careful calculation of social benefits otherwise there will be a greater loss in efficiency in the areas where the subsidy is collected than the gain in the industry receiving the subsidy. Thus, the cost of collecting and dispensing the subsidy must also be taken into account if a true optimal output is to be achieved.   

11.4.5		Property Rights and Coase Theorem

We have seen earlier that externality may arise because of lack of property rights. The Coase theorem postulates that when property rights are clearly defined and transaction costs are zero, perfect competition results in internalization of externalities, regardless of how property rights are assigned among the parties (individuals or firms). We can go back to our example of chemical industry and soft drink industry to illustrate the how the Coase theorem works. 

Suppose that in order to purify water that is required to make drinks, the soft drink industry incurs a cost of 10,000 shillings per month. Suppose also that the chemical industry incur 6,000 shillings per month to dispose its waste product by other means than discharging the waste into river. If the soft drink industry has the property right to use clean water, the chemical industry will incur the added cost of 6,000 shillings per month to dispose its waste without polluting the river; otherwise the soft drink industry would sue the chemical industry and claims the 10,000 shillings as a cost of purifying water. 

On the other hand, if the chemical industry has the property right to the river and can freely use it to dump its wastes, the soft drink industry would be required to pay 6,000 shillings per month to the chemical industry as a compensation for not polluting the river. In doing so, the soft drink industry would be avoiding to incur the cost of 10,000 shillings to purify the water. Thus, the cost of avoiding pollution is internalized by the chemical industry in the first instance and by the soft drink industry in the second instance. 


It is important, however, to recognize that Coase Theorem assumes that the cost of negotiating and contracting by the interested parties are relatively small. If the number of interested parties is large, it may not be feasible to get the unanimity required to make the negotiations effective. Indeed, even if the costs are moderate, negotiations of this sort may not be practical. And, if the number of interested parties is small, the fact that mutually advantageous deals are possible does not mean that they will necessarily be consummated. 
 
11.4.6	Regulation
The government may adopt regulatory measures in order to control the level of pollution in the economy. We use a very simplified model of this regulatory process as shown in figure 11.6. The horizontal axis in figure 11.6 shows the percentage reduction in environmental pollution that would occur in the absence of any regulation. 
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Figure 11.6:	Optimal Pollution    
The curve MB in the figure shows social benefits obtained by reducing pollution by one more unit. These benefits consist possibly improved health, the availability of additional recreational benefits and improved production opportunities for other firms. As for most economic activities, this provision of benefit is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal returns. That is, the curve MB slopes down ward to reflect the fact that the marginal benefits from additional reductions in pollution decline as stricter control are implemented.     

The curve MC in the above figure represents the marginal costs incurred in reducing environmental emissions. These costs include both foregone profits from a lower output and actual costs associated with using anti-pollution equipment. The positive slope of this curve reflects increasing marginal cost. It is shown in figure 11.6 that R* is the optimal level of pollution emission since any reductions less than R* (such as RL), the marginal benefits associated with further tightening of environmental controls exceed the marginal cost of achieving lower pollution levels, so emissions should be reduced further. Reductions in excess of R* are also inefficient –environmental control can be pushed too far. At RH the marginal cost of emissions control exceeds the marginal benefits obtained, so less strict regulation may be desirable. 


11.4.7	Permits and Direct Control






















	1.	An externality is an effect of one economic agent’s activities on 	another economic agent that is not taken into account by the 	normal operations of the market price system. Put it differently, 	when 	the activity of one entity (firm or person) directly affects the 	welfare of another in a way that is not transmitted by market prices, 	that effect is called externality. 2.	Externalities can be classified as either positive or negative, 	depending on whether individual enjoy extra benefits they did not 	pay for or suffer extra cost they did not incur. Positive externalities 	generally include things like public goods and research. Negative 	externalities on the other hand include things like air pollution.3.	The externality between firms occurs when the activity of one firm 	affect the wellbeing of another firm outside the market system. The 	externality between firm and people occurs when the activities of 	the 	firm impact directly on individual’s wellbeing4.	Since human societies have less developed property and communal 	property rights over the resources like air, space and water both 	positive and negative externalities can arise. There reason is that the 	resources cannot easily be owned that firms 	and consumers are not 	excluded from using them in ways, which affect third parties.5.	When the private cost is smaller than the social cost, adherence to 	the 	rule MC=P leads to overproduction of Q. By analogous argument 	it 	can be shown that if MC>MSC, the level of production of Q 	will be less than the socially optimum. Divergence 	between private 	and social cost (and benefits) results to misallocation of 	resources 	in a perfectly competitive system.6.	A tax or subsidy on an externality that brings about an equality of 	private and social marginal cost is called pigovian tax (subsidy)7.	Coase theorem postulates that when property rights are clearly 	defined and transaction costs are zero, perfect competition results 	in 	internalization of externalities, regardless of how property 	rights 	are 	assigned among the parties (individuals or firms). Property rights 	are 	the legal specification of who owns a good and of the types of 	trades that the current owner is allowed to make. 8.	Solution to mitigate externalities may involve merger and social 	convention, establishment of property rights, tax, subsidies, permits 	and direct control
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(a)	Short run marginal cost is SMC=20Q+4. To find the firm’s short run supply curve, it is important to begin by finding the minimum point of the average of the variable cost (AVC) by setting the average variable cost equals to the short run marginal cost:
10Q+4=20Q+4
        Q=0
At Q=0, average variable cost is AVC=10Q+4=10(0)+4=4. The firm’s supply curve is the short run marginal cost curve above the minimum point of the average variable cost. Thus, supply is given by;

		








	    Setting the market supply equal to market demand implies
				S (P)=D (P)
				5P-20=100-P
     6P=120
      P=20

(c)	Plugging P=20 into (P) implies (20)==0.80. Each firm will produce 0.80, for a total of 80 units for the market.









(a)	The equilibrium price that will prevail in the market is 8. That is, P = 8.  We know 	that firms always produce at the minimum of average total cost, and we also know 	that average total cost attains its minimum when it intersects with marginal cost.  	Since TC and MC are given, we just need to construct ATC.

ATC = TC/Q = Q + 2 + 9/Q

Setting this equal to MC gives us:  ATC = MC = 






Plugging Q = 3 into either ATC or MC gives us that the price in the market is P =8 

(b)	In part a. we solved for the long-run equilibrium quantity of each firm.  Q = 3.

(c)	82 firms.  We know that each firm will produce 3 units at a price of 8, so we need to find out how many firms are needed to satisfy demand when price equals 8.  Plugging P = 8 into the demand equation gives us that the aggregate quantity demanded equals 246.

P = 8 = 500 – 2Q




Since each firm produces a quantity of 3 in the long-run equilibrium, then the number of firms equals 246/3 = 82.

Number of firms * Quantity of each firm = Total Quantity
Number of firms = Total Quantity / Quantity of each firm
Number of firms = 246 / 3= 82.







 (a)	As illustrated in figure 2.12, total output of the monopolist that is practicing price 	discrimination is given by the horizontal summation of output in different the two 	markets. Thus, the aggregate demand function is:


We can also express the above equation as a function of price as follow:






















(b)	 In order to maximize profits, marginal revenue in both markets must be equal. 	That is, MC = MR1 = MR2 where MR1 is the marginal revenue for class 1 and 	MR2 for class 2. Thus, if the total quantity produced is 6 units, the MC of 	producing this 	level of output is T.Shs12.

For the first market class, setting MC calculated as 12 equal to the MR1 curve yields the following equation:

12 = 20 – 4Q1

For the second market class, setting MC calculated as 12 equal to the MR2 curve yields the following equation:

12= 16 – Q2

Solving these we get Q1 = 2 and Q2 = 4 and hence P1 =16 and P2 = 14

(c)	Total profit = (16 – 6)*2 + (14 – 6)*4 = 20 + 32 = 52 which is higher than the 	profit without price discrimination.

(d)	Price elasticity of demand for class 1; e1 = (1/slope) *P1/Q1 =  4
    
Price elasticity of demand for class 2; e2 = (1/slope) *P2/Q2 = 7

The firm charges a higher price for the market class with lower price elasticity of demand and a lower price for the market class with higher price elasticity of demand.

(e)	 Now the equations are 

   20 – 4Q1 = 4 and 16 – Q2 = 4
  So Q1 = 4, P1 = 12 and Q2 = 12, P2 = 10

  Net profit = (12 – 4)*4 + (10 – 4)*12 = 32 + 72 = 104 > profit generated in part (b).

(g)	Price elasticity of demand for class 1 = (1/2)*(12/4) = 1.5 
  	Price elasticity of demand for class 2 = 2*(10/12) = 5/3









(a)      Q = 22, P = 56; Profit = 22*56 – 20 – 12*22 = 44*22 – 20 = 948
Monopolistic equilibrium 
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(a) 	If both firms enter the market, and they collude, they will face a marginal revenue curve with twice the slope of the demand ccurve: 
MR = 50 - 10Q. 
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost (the marginal cost of Firm 1, since it is lower than that of Firm 2) to determine the profit-maximizing quantity, Q: 
50 - 10Q = 10, or Q = 4. 
Substituting Q = 4 into the demand function to determine price: 
P = 50 – 5*4 = 30. 
(b)	The question now is how the firms will divide the total output of 4 among themselves. Since the two firms have different cost functions, it will not be optimal for them to split the output evenly between them. The profit maximizing solution is for firm 1 to produce all of the output so that the profit for Firm 1 will be: 
π1 = (30)(4) - (20 + (10)(4)) = 60. 
The profit for Firm 2 will be: 
π2 = (30)(0) - (10 + (12)(0)) = -10. 
Total industry profit will be: 
πT = π1 + π2 = 60 - 10 = 50. 
If they split the output evenly between them then total profit would be 46 (20 for firm 1 and 26 for firm 2). If firm 2 preferred to earn a profit of 26 as opposed to 25 then firm 1 could give 1 to firm 2 and it would still have profit of 24, which is higher than the 20 it would earn if they split output. Note that if firm 2 supplied all the output then it would set marginal revenue equal to its marginal cost or 12 and earn a profit of 62.2. In this case, firm 1 would earn a profit of –20, so that total industry profit would be 42.2. 
(c)	If Firm 1 were the only entrant, its profits would be 60 and Firm 2’s would be 0. If Firm 2 were the only entrant, then it would equate marginal revenue with its marginal cost to determine its profit-maximizing quantity: 
50 - 10Q2 = 12, or Q2 = 3.8. 
Substituting Q2 into the demand equation to determine price: 
P = 50 – 5*3.8 = 31. 
The profits for Firm 2 will be: 
π2 = (31)(3.8) - (10 + (12)(3.8)) = 62.20. 
Question number four
(a)	The monopolist wants to choose quantity to maximize its profits: 
max π = PQ - C(Q), 
π = (53 - Q)(Q) - 5Q, or π = 48Q – Q2. 




Substitute the profit-maximizing quantity, Q = 24, into the demand function to find price: 
24 = 53 - P, or P = 29. 
Profits are equal to 
π = TR - TC = (29)(24) - (5)(24) = 576. 

(b)	When the second firm enters, price can be written as a function of the output of two firms: P = 53 - Q1 - Q2. We may write the profit functions for the two firms: 
		π1= PQ1-C (Q1)=(53-Q1-Q2)Q1-5Q1 
π2=PQ2−C (Q2)=(53−Q1−Q2)Q2−5Q2

(c)	Under the Cournot assumption, Firm 1 treats the output of Firm 2 as a constant in its maximization of profits. Therefore, Firm 1 chooses Q1 to maximize π1 in b with Q2 being treated as a constant. The change in π1 with respect to a change in Q1 is 
		
   
This above equation is the reaction function for Firm 1, which generates the profit- maximizing level of output, given the constant output of Firm 2. Because the problem is symmetric, the reaction function for Firm 2 is:


(d)	To find the level of output for each firm that would result in a stationary equilibrium, we solve for the values of Q1 and Q2 that satisfy both reaction functions by substituting the reaction function for Firm 2 into the one for Firm 1: 
 Or Q1=16

By symmetry, Q2 = 16. 
To determine the price, substitute Q1 and Q2 into the demand equation: 
P = 53 - 16 - 16 = 21. 
Profits are given by 
πi = PQi - C (Qi) = πi = (21)(16) - (5)(16) = 256. 







(a)	What is firm A’s best strategy for each of Firm B’ possible reaction?
If firm B advertises, then firm A will make larger profits (10>5) if it advertises itself. If firm B does not advertise, it still pays more for firm A to advertise (15>12)
(b)	What is firm B’ best strategy for each of Firm A’s possible actions?
If firm A advertises, then firm B will make larger profits (10>5) if it advertises itself. If firm A does not advertise, it still pays more for firm B to advertise (15>12)
(c)	Is advertising a dominant strategy for either of them?
(d)	If each firm chooses to its best strategy, what will be the outcome? Discuss. 




(a)	In this game, “Aggressive” is a dominant strategy for both firms. Thus, the Nash equilibrium strategy for both firm is to choose “Aggressive”






(a)	The equilibrium level of W and L can be obtained by equating demand and supply for labour as follows:

-50W+450=100W
Thus, the equilibrium wage rate and employment of labour are 3 and 300 respectively
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With a subsidy, demand is now L=-50(W-Subsidy)+450.  So, when W=4, L=400. The new equilibrium is obtained by 400=-50(4-Subsidy)+450. Hence, Subsidy=3


(c)	From part (b) we see that as a result of government subsidy the total 	employment is increased to 400 labour

(d)	Since there are now 400 labour as a result of government intervention, the 	total subsidy that the government would pay is equal to T.Shs 1200 	(i.e.400x3)

















(b)	Plug L*=333 into the supply curve for labour. Remember, the wage is below the value of marginal expenditure.
333=100w; which implies w*=3.3
(c)	The wage in part (b) is below the MRPL at that particular level of employment. Note that, at L*=333, the marginal revenue product is:
MRPL=







(a)	In equilibrium we must have quantity-supplied equal to quantity demanded in both the butter and margarine markets. This implies that in equilibrium we will have:


Substituting in the given curves implies:

 			




When , . At these prices, QM=15 and QB=30










	  When , . At these prices, QM =10.43 and QB=33.91. 
The increase in the price of vegetable oil increases the price of margarine and   decreases the quantity of margarine consumed. As consumers switch to butter, the price of butter rises and the quantity of butter consumed goes up. 

(c)	The price of butter rises when the price of vegetable oil rises because butter and margarine are substitutes. When the supply of margarine declines raising the price of margarine, consumer substitute butter for margarine, increasing demand for butter and raising both the equilibrium price and quantity for butter. 

Question number six
(a)	For this allocation to satisfy the condition of exchange efficiency, the indifference curves of Anne and Sonia must be tangent to one another. To check whether the tangency condition holds, we need to compute the marginal rate of substitution for Sonia and Anne. 

When Sonia has 2 apples and 4 pears, her marginal rate of substitution of apples for pears is


This tells us that Sonia is willing to give up one pear in order to get one additional apple. 

When Anne has 8 apples and 2 pears, her marginal rate of substitution of apples for peas is


This tells us that Anne is willing to give up 4 pears to get 1 additional apple. We can see from these calculations that for Sonia and Anne the marginal rate of substitution of apples for pears are not equal. Therefore, their indifference curves are not tangent, and the condition of exchange efficiency does not hold. 
  
(b)	The fact that the existing allocation of apples and pears is inefficient means that Anne and Sonia could both be made better off by trading with each other. To see why, suppose that Anne gives 2 of her pears to Sonia in exchange for 1 of Sonia’s apples. This makes both individual better off. To see why, recall that Anne was willing to give up four pears to get one additional apple. Because she only gives up two pears to get that extra apple, Anne is better off. What about Sonia? She was willing to give up one apple to get one additional pear. Under the proposed deal, Sonia gives up one apple to get two extra pears. Thus, Sonia is better off as well. There are many other possible trades between Anne and Sonia that would have made both better off. The key point is that whenever the condition of exchange efficiency does not hold, there is always the possibility of a beneficial gain from trade between individuals in the economy. 

Question number seven
(a)	In the case of good X1 and X2, the marginal rate of technical substitution of labour and capital are as follows:


Therefore, the allocation K1=50, L1=50, K2=50 and L2=50 is efficient because 












Question number four 







Both project are viable as they produce positive NPV. Moreover, the second project is preferred since it has the higher value. You can see that this recommendation is correct by considering how you might invest T.Shs 30,000 thousand. If the government opt for project A then the best it can do is to invest T.Shs 1000 thousand of this amount to give a return of T.Shs 1200 thousand in four year’s time. The remaining T.Shs 29,000 thousand could be invested at the market rate of 3% to yield 
	29,000(1.06)-4=32,639.76 
The total return is:
1200+32639.76=33,839.76
On the other hand, if the government opt for project B then the whole of T.Shs 30,000 thousand can be invested to yield T.Shs 35,000 thousand. In other words, in four year’s time the government would be:
	35,000-33,639.76=1160.24
Better off by choosing project B, which confirms the advice given by the NPV method. However, this is contrary to the advice given by the IRR method. For project A, the IRR is given as:

	  
 Dividing by 1000 gives
		





For Project B, the IRR, is given as:

This can be solved as before to get  =3.9%

Project A gives the higher internal rate of return even though, as we have seen, project B is the preferred one. 












	Note that the total cost is 1000x1 since the firm operates only one well.
	The externality arises since individual firm doesn’t take into account 	the fact that its production affects the production of every other firm












(c)	Without government intervention there will be N=400 firms. The 	government wants to have N=200 firms. How can we implement the 	licence fee? The license fee increases the marginal cost of production, so 	we can write
MC	=	1000	+ license fee
The individual firm chooses to produces where TR=TC, so from (a) we can write:

		TR= 5000-10N=1000+ license fee . 
The optimal number of firms is 200N. So if we want N=200, then;
		5000-10(200)=1000+ license fee 
		5000-2000-1000= license fee 
		2000	= license fee 




(a)	To maximize profits, the cement factory chooses output (q) so that MC (q)=MR (q).
2q=28-2q, q=7. 

(b)	Price is found by plugging (q) into the inverse demand function, 
So, P=28-7=21. 
Since TR=147 > TC=50, the monopolist will produce 7 bags of cements, causing a total level of pollution of T.Shs 133 (i.e.19x7)


(c)	SMC=PMC + cost of externality. Where, SMC is the social marginal cost, and PMC is private marginal cost. It follows therefore that SMC=2Q+19. (Note that since the externality is negative it increases costs.).

(d)	For social optimum, we want P=SMC.
P=28-Q=2Q+19, Q=3.

Alternative Government Policy Evaluation
(1) 	Forcing the firm to produce where P=MC would lead to greater inefficiency 	since the cement factory would be forced to produce more. (28-q=2q, q=28/3. 	Note that this would correspond to the quantity a perfectly competitive firm 	would produce). The government should try to make the monopoly produce 	less since the efficient quantity is 3, whereas the monopoly is currently 	producing 7.

2) 	Subsidizing the firm would make the problem worse, and the firm would 	produce even more. (The firms PMC would be 2q-19 and by setting 	MR=PMC, 28-2q=2q-19, q=47/4)

3) 	By taxing the firm T.Shs 19, its PMC=2q+19, and by setting MR=PMC, 28-	2q=2q+19, q=9/4. This is still not the socially optimum quantity. Even though 	in this case we have PMC=SMC, since the firm does not face a horizontal 	demand, its MR is below the demand function and it ends of producing a 	lower 	quantity than the efficient one. This suggests that the tax should be less 	than 	T.Shs19.
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^1	  Monoposony is a market for factors of production dominated by a single buyer. This concept is discussed in detail in lecture seven. 
^2	  Note that the average revenue is equal to price; AR=TR/Q=PQ/Q=P 
^3	  The concept of economies of scale is discussed in detail in OEC 101—Introduction to Microeconomics I
^4	  The Cournot model was developed by Augustine Cournot in 1838.
^5	  A situation is called Pareto efficient if it is not possible to make someone better off without making someone else worse off. The concept of Pareto efficiency is explained in detail in lecture nine. 
^6	  Note that VMPK is not shown here to conserve the space. 
^7	  It is assumed that students are well familiar with graphical treatment of shifts in demand and supply curves for a commodity. 
^8	  It is assumed that a single variable factor is used in the production process. 
^9	  A separate topic on externality is treated in lecture eleven. 
^10	  Hicks, John. R (1939) The Foundation of Welfare Economics, Economic Journal, December, pp. 696-712, Kaldor, Nicholas (1939) “Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility, Economic Journal, December, pp. 549-552.
^11	  Scitovsky, T., (1941) “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 9, pp.77-88
^12	  In this analysis, the absolute amount of utility associated with each alternative is irrelevant. The vertical distance could change, but as long as the pattern of peaks stays unchanged, so does the outcome of voting.
^13	  North, D. C., and R. P. Thomas (1973) The Rise of the Western World. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
^14	 A. C. Pigou., (1920) The Economics of Welfare, McMillan & Co., London. This solution was first suggested in the 1920 by A.C.Pigou—hence the name of the tax itself
